Public Bill Committee

[Mr. Frank Cook in the Chair]

Clause 39

Extension of licensing scheme

Question (this day) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Frank Cook: I remind the Committee that with this it will be convenient to discuss the following: new clause 3-Limitation on powers to immobilise, restrict or remove vehicles-
'(1) The Private Security Industry Act 2001 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 4 there is inserted-
"4A Limitation on powers to immobilise, restrict or remove vehicles
(1) A person may not carry out an activity to which paragraph 3 (immobilisation of vehicles) or 3A (restriction and removal of vehicles) of Schedule 2 applies unless he is either-
(a) a public authority, or
(b) acting on behalf of a public authority.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the person carries out an activity on behalf of a public authority in particular-
(a) if he is, and is acting as, the public authority's employee, or
(b) if he is acting pursuant to a contract for the supply of services with the public authority only where that contract does not allow him, or any other person, to benefit from a variable financial incentive which is dependent on the number of vehicles immobilised, restricted or removed."'.
New clause 27-Prohibition of immobilisation or restriction and removal of vehicles-
'(1) A person commits an offence if the person carries out any of the following activities-
(a) the immobilisation of a motor vehicle by the attachment to the vehicle, or to a part of it, of an immobilising device;
(b) the demanding or collection of a charge as a condition of the removal of an immobilising device from a motor vehicle;
(c) the moving of a vehicle, or the restriction of the movement of a vehicle, by any means;
(d) the demanding or collection of a charge as a condition of any release of a vehicle which has been so moved or restricted;
unless that activity is carried out with the consent of the owner, keeper or user of the vehicle.
(2) A person who is an occupier of any premises commits an offence if-
(a) another person carries out, in relation to vehicles on those premises, any activities falling within subsection (1), and
(b) those activities are carried out with the permission of that occupier or for the purposes of, or in connection with, any contract for the supply of services to him.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable-
(a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine.
(4) The Private Security Industry Act 2001 is amended as follows-
(a) omit section 6;
(b) in Schedule 2 omit paragraphs 3 and 3A.'.
New clause 30-Code of conduct (Private Security Industry Act 2001)-
'The Secretary of State shall by regulations make provision for the introduction of a code of conduct in respect of vehicle immobilisation activities and the issuing of penalties for parking on private land undertaken by any business licensed under section 4A of the Private Security Industry Act 2001 (inserted by section 39 of this Act), including making provision for requirements for appropriate signage on private land and maximum levels of penalties which may be levied.'.

Alan Campbell: I was responding to the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham who was, unusually, promoting the notion of a ban-albeit a delayed one-that would be introduced, ironically, through a statutory instrument. Therefore, I assume that this is a rather academic discussion.

Douglas Hogg: The Minister will recall that I suggested an amendable statutory instrument.

Alan Campbell: Amendable, but a statutory instrument nevertheless. That will not be necessary because the short history of the issue shows that the Government have moved from the licensing of individuals involved in wheel-clamping to the current proposals on the licensing of companies. We have demonstrated our intent, and we would not have got to this stage-a major part of a major Bill-were we not determined to take the correct action that will have the desired effect. I do not accept that we should have a ban, albeit one that hangs like the sword of Damocles.
I shall respond quickly to my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South, who suggested that we could avoid the problems if the owners of private land simply fenced it off. We had a short discussion about whether that was mainly a rural issue. It is an urban issue, too, because there are many areas, including old people's homes, hospitals and a variety of private land, that require some form of parking control. There is a host of areas for which it would be impractical to insist that if owners did not want people to park there, they should fence them off. That is why we are making our current suggestions.
The hon. Member for Romford highlighted the need for the action we are taking, because he gave a number of examples of the type of unacceptable behaviour that we are trying to get rid of. These include release fees, signage and so on, which will be an important part of the code of practice.
I want to concentrate slightly longer on the comments made by the hon. Member for Winchester, who set out a range of objections to the route we are taking. I shall try to persuade his colleagues and others that ours is the right route. He advocated that local authorities should take control of the situation. Like the hon. Member for Romford, I cannot recall from the evidence session that the representative of local authorities showed a great deal of enthusiasm for the idea of them taking this on. We kept coming back to the perennial cost question and an acknowledgment that, were we to go down that route with an entirely different model, there would be a cost involved. I am not sure that the local taxpayer should pick up the cost. The way in which we are proceeding represents a fairer and more proportionate system.

Tom Brake: I wonder whether the Minister can recall any enthusiasm from the witnesses for the Government's solution.

Alan Campbell: The hon. Gentleman says that but, in fact, we have been consulting on a range of proposals for some time. I accept that nobody came out in complete support of everything that we were doing. However, by and large, we have managed to satisfy a majority on most of the issues raised in those sessions and during the consultation process, such as what a code of practice would look like, or crucially whether there should be an independent appeals mechanism. I admit that at one point it was not clear that that was what we were proposing-but we are. People often have their own views and put forward alternatives. However, in the absence of a clearly more acceptable alternative, I think that we have broad support for our suggestions.
The hon. Member for Winchester mentioned incentivisation, which we have discussed before, with regard to whether there will be a great incentive to carry out wheel-clamping to maximise profits. Incentivisation might have an attraction now, because there is a fairly open-ended and loose system through which people can make extortionate profits, but part of what we are doing is to put limits on things such as release fees and to address issues regarding what happens if vehicles are impounded overnight and whether people have to pay for that. Many incentives that might have been in place will not exist under the scheme that we are advocating. The hon. Gentleman also mentioned the need for an appeals procedure. As we will discuss later, there will be not only such a procedure, but an independent one.
The hon. Gentleman also spoke about some entirely unacceptable examples of people who were forced to abandon their cars during the bad weather coming back to find that they were wheel-clamped. I cannot give a complete undertaking that that will not be possible in the future, but if we address issues such as signage and release fees, many of those problems could be resolved. If Members of Parliament and others are thinking about going to the companies and saying, "Surely this is unfair," please remember that companies will need to have an appeals procedure and, under the code of practice, they will also need to have a complaints procedure. Beyond that, there will also be an independent complaints procedure, through which I am sure some such complaints could be not only heard, but upheld.

Douglas Hogg: With regard to the appeals procedure and its independence, who will determine the criteria that the independent appellate body will have to apply?

Alan Campbell: The code of practice will set out clearly what companies will be allowed and not allowed to do. It will deal with issues such as how much had been charged, whether the signage was adequate, whether there was information about whom one could complain to, which company was responsible in the first instance, and how one could get in touch with the appeals procedure. All that will be dealt with in the code of practice. Therefore, in a sense, the independent adjudicators will not only be addressing the code of practice because, as we will get on to later, legal minds will be brought to bear, so I am sure that they will be able to bring some reasonableness and common sense to the issue.

Douglas Hogg: I am sorry to press the Minister on this matter, but it is important. An element of discretion will always be involved, and I am trying to ascertain whether the independent adjudicator in the appeals process-

Frank Cook: Order. I ought to advise the Committee that we are straying into the area covered by Government amendment 110 and Government new clause 10. It is not strictly relevant.

Douglas Hogg: Given that the issue has been raised, Mr. Cook, whether it would be convenient to deal with it now is a matter for you. If not, I will postpone my comments-whatever you think fit.

Frank Cook: That would be the proper way to approach it.

Douglas Hogg: Then that is what we will do.

Alan Campbell: The hon. Member for Winchester also raised the question of self-regulation. We are not going down that route. He talked about some of the problems that have arisen with ticket parking. We are determined not to go down that route because we want to ensure that our proposals have teeth. He also asked, as his defence of using local authorities as the best route on this matter, whether the proposal amounted to a licence to print money. I remind the Committee that we intend to cap fees and, through that, to change business behaviour.
Let me say-I do not think that this has been raised, but it is pertinent to the whole of our deliberations-that while the proposal is about changing the behaviour of the businesses currently involved in vehicle immobilisation, it is also about changing motorists' behaviour. The reality is that quite a number of people who are clamped are clamped for valid reasons-they should not be parking where they have parked. Therefore, we must have a system that is proportionate.
Finally, the hon. Gentleman expressed concern that if it was left to the companies, and not the local authorities, the companies would simply disappear, and rebrand and relaunch themselves. I have two points to make about that: first, they would still need a licence if they attempted to do that; and, secondly, the Security Industry Authority is very experienced in dealing with such practice, because it has been attempted in other areas of its activity. It is very good at holding to account people who try to evade the rules and directors who think they are being clever by setting up a different company. I am confident that we are taking the right route.
By restricting wheel-clamping activities to local authorities, new clause 3 would effectively ban wheel-clamping on private land, because of course local authorities have no power to control parking on private land. We would be taking quite a big step if we went down that route. Some people have advocated that as a way forward, but we believe that a system of licensing businesses will deal with the matter more effectively.
Let me briefly turn to new clause 27(1), which would ban wheel-clamping and related activities, restriction and removal against a release fee. Subsection (2) of the new clause would mean that an occupier of the premises would be committing an offence automatically if anyone else carried out wheel-clamping and related activities on his premises with his permission. It would only require the occupier to have given permission for the activity to take place, or for those activities to be carried out under a contract for the supply of services to him. That would not be the right approach. It is appropriate to allow wheel-clamping on private land in England and Wales to continue. I know that that is not a universal view, but that is our belief, subject to the new controls on the wheel-clamping businesses. We want to strike the right balance between the rights of motorists and the rights of landowners, who are entitled to control or prevent parking on their land. For example, businesses in a town centre or near a railway station will quite reasonably want to keep their parking space free for customers. We do not believe that we should limit their choice of how they do that, provided that they comply with the law. We want to ensure that the sector is regulated properly and that we get rid of exploitation and excess, which is what our measures will do.
New clause 27(3) would restrict the penalties available to a fine without the option of imprisonment. As we discussed that matter earlier today in relation to amendments 90 to 93, I will not go into any more detail.
New clause 30 would create a statutory requirement to make regulations that would provide for a code of practice for the business licensing scheme. The provision is unnecessary because the Private Security Industry Act 2001 already provides for regulations to be made whereby the Secretary of State can specify the conditions to be attached to any licence that the Security Industry Authority issues. We have made it very clear-and I am happy to repeat it again-that we plan to make regulations that will be the basis for a code of practice. We expect that they will cover warning signs, release fees and a range of other matters. We will put it in secondary legislation because, having listened to a fairly lengthy debate both inside and outside the House, we want to decide on the contents, and consult publicly on the details. I hope that I have explained sufficiently why new clauses 3, 27 and 30 are not necessary, and I hope that clause 39 will stand part of the Bill.

Shona McIsaac: Thank you for calling me to speak in this debate, Mr. Cook. I shall try to be brief. I tried to catch your eye earlier, but the Under-Secretary stood up and blocked me.

Frank Cook: Order. In view of what has just been put on the record, and given my 27 years of experience in the House, may I offer the hon. Lady a small word of advice? In future, when choosing a seat, make sure you are in full view of the Chair.

Shona McIsaac: I have already taken that advice on board, Mr. Cook, which is why I have moved from where I was sitting this morning. I will now be able to catch your eye whenever I wish this afternoon.
I have sympathy with some of the new clauses about wheel-clampers. During the evidence sittings, it became apparent to me that we do not really need wheel-clamping firms. Whatever the Minister says about people who park illegally, surely we do not need clamping firms to enforce regulations. We should have a properly regulated ticketing system, which I will talk about later.
I agree that we need good signage, limits on release fees and a code of practice, but, as we heard in the evidence sittings, the fear of the RAC and others is that the firms currently making a lot of money through practices that extort money from people will move to ticketing. I am sorry to say that the types of restrictions that we are introducing for wheel-clamping firms will not read across to ticketing. The same firms often carry out such practices. As we heard, they will put up a closed circuit television camera and small, insignificant notices, and if people overstay an hour's parking, they will end up getting a parking charge disguised as a penalty charge notice.
In my area-part of my constituency is a seaside resort-many visitors, as well as residents, keep getting caught out, because private firms operate alongside local authority car parks. We have to do something to prevent that leaching to ticketing. Those firms make their money through excessive charges. The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham may correct me, but I believe that there is absolutely nothing in criminal law that says that such firms can issue excessive charges. There is no way that they can take somebody to court or put points on a licence.

Douglas Hogg: I think that is correct. The only way in which that could technically be done would be for the owner to lodge a civil suit for trespass. The unauthorised parking of a vehicle on private property is a trespass for which, in theory at least, one could claim damages, which would represent some form of rental charge. I think that is the only legal process that would ever be available to an occupier of private land in the circumstances under discussion.

Shona McIsaac: I appreciate that clarification. It is, therefore, correct that the firms rely on ignorance of the law by issuing things that look, to all intents and purposes, like a penalty charge notice. They have the same lay-out and use the same typefaces, and they threaten to take one to court, even though they cannot do so. I am worried that the unintended consequence of what we are doing for the wheel-clamping firms-or vehicle immobilisation firms-is that they are simply going to make their money in an unregulated way.
I realise that there are limitations in the Bill, because we are dealing with the security industry. However, I understand that it is the Department for Transport that would have to do something to deal with ticketing if the firms choose to go down that road to make their money. What discussions has my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary had with the Department for Transport about those issues? Is there any chance that we can address those worries on Report?

Tom Brake: I apologise on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester, who cannot be here to listen to the Minister's detailed and considered response to the points made by my hon. Friend on new clause 3.
I listened carefully, but the bottom line is that the Minister is not in a position to give any assurances. The Minister cannot assure the Committee that someone who is clamped-whether legally parked or otherwise-on a cold and windy night and not sure who owns the land will not be fleeced by a wheel-clamper. New clause 3 makes the matter clear; it is very simple and straightforward.
The Minister may be right that local authorities would not be keen on the responsibility if they were required to pick up the operating cost themselves, but I am sure that there are ways and means of ensuring that that would not be the case, and that those seeking support for wheel-clamping, rather than the council tax payer, would pay the fee. We would support making sure that there was no linkage between the number of clamps applied and the fee that any company, local authority or private contractor employed by a local authority could obtain from the clamping.
Again, the bottom line has to be whether the measure will work to protect drivers in all circumstances. The Minister cannot assure the Committee that what he is proposing, for which there was no great enthusiasm among the witnesses, will do the job. When there is an opportunity to vote against the clause, I shall certainly do so.

Douglas Hogg: May I make this point to the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington? The problem about voting against the new clause is that, in theory, we are left with nothing, which is bad news. I would prefer the total ban, but I do not think that I shall be allowed to vote for that and, in any case, I do not suppose I have the big battalions. If we vote against clause stand part, we are left without any form of regulatory regime, which would be bad news. Although, personally, I am uncomfortable with the way forward and would prefer the course of action that I advocated to the Committee, I shall not be supporting the hon. Gentleman and I rather hope that my colleagues will not.

Alan Campbell: We have been looking at the issue for some time and I understand that there are different views about the best way forward. Should local authorities be responsible? Should we ban wheel-clamping in the first place? In reality, in many cases, private landowners need some way of regulating parking on their land and, in some cases, of preventing parking on their land. In the Bill, we are cleaning up an industry which, as it currently operates, has many examples of unacceptable practice.
That does not, however, necessarily lead to the conclusion that there is no room for wheel-clamping at all, which to some extent is a matter of choice for landowners. If they go down that route, then by licensing the businesses with a strict code of conduct, we expect the excesses to disappear and the industry to be as responsible as it can be in the circumstances.
On the issue of ticketing, clamping is dealt with because we are doing it through the SIA-clamping is dealt with through the Private Security Industry Act 2001, but ticketing is not. I have had discussions with colleagues from the Department for Transport, in particular when we were looking to secure an independent appeals procedure and looking for models that we could either piggyback or replicate somewhere else, but the issue of ticketing is for them to deal with. In the Bill, we are dealing with wheel-clamping.
The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington claims that I am not in a position to reassure people that their circumstances will be better on a cold and windy night, when they risk being fleeced. However cold and windy it happens to be, unless there is adequate signage that is informative about what can and cannot take place in that area, the code of practice will be being breached.
If by "being fleeced" the hon. Gentleman means that people will be given excessive charges for release, I should say that that will not be allowed under the code either. If they are not happy and cannot come to some agreement with the company if wheel-clamping is taking place, there will be an independent appeals procedure which will have the final say. Ultimately, if a company acts in the way suggested by the hon. Gentleman, it risks losing its licence. If it loses its licence it cannot take part in the industry in future. I am not as pessimistic as the hon. Gentleman about the outcome of the Bill.

Tom Brake: I thank the Minister for giving way. How will he ensure that drivers have a clear understanding of what they are supposed to be seeing on the notices on this hypothetical cold, windy and perhaps wet night? He cannot give those assurances. He cannot give an assurance that they will know what is required to be on display and therefore the risk of people being clamped in unacceptable circumstances remains, because they will not be in a position to challenge it.

Alan Campbell: That is precisely why we are consulting widely and thoroughly on not only the question of signage, but what would be on the signs. I take the point that if it is dark the signage needs to be lit. Many people in all of our constituencies use car parks on cold, windy and wet nights, but that is not an excuse to say, "I'm not going to pay that fine because I could not understand the sign". Those signs will have been worked out; the lighting will be adequate. The machines will be clear, so there will be no prospect of people's not knowing what their responsibility is if they park their vehicles.

Andrew Rosindell: The fact is that however a new law on vehicle clamping is implemented, there will be problems to be resolved. There is some consensus between the Government and the Opposition on the fact that if we do nothing, we leave a problem without a solution. Does signage need to be explained to every driver? Everywhere we go on every highway there is signage. Surely it is common sense that, if we park our cars somewhere, just as we do when we park in a public car park, we check the signs to see whether there is a fee to pay and what the rules are. If the Liberal Democrats oppose the measure, a lot of people out there will wonder why. A lot of people are very angry about the current law and they want it to be tightened. The clause may not go as far as we would like, but it is a step in the right direction.

Alan Campbell: I am grateful for that support. It would not be the first time that the Liberals were on the wrong side of the public, and I suspect it will not be the last. The public are not fools, particularly when there is publicity for such issues, and they know what their responsibilities are. I am sure that where there are anomalies or disagreements, if the two parties cannot agree, there will be an opportunity to resolve those matters once the complaints and independent appeals procedure is in place. There are many views about how the problems can be resolved, but we have produced a set of proposals that commands general support. I hope that the Committee will support them.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The Committee divided: Ayes 13, Noes 1.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Clause 39 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule agreed to.

Clause 40 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 41

Offence of possessing mobile telephone in prison

Andrew Rosindell: I beg to move amendment 173, in clause 41, page 83, line 24, after 'telephone', insert
'or any device capable of sending or receiving electronic data'.
The amendment would tighten up the sensible policy of removing mobile devices from prisoners serving custodial sentences and not allowing them to communicate with the outside world. There is, however, little point in doing that unless we ensure that other devices are also unavailable to the prisoner. In the modern world, all sorts of devices, particularly those that access the internet, allow people to communicate with the outside world, so there is little point in singling out the mobile phone, although we support that prohibition wholeheartedly. With the amendment, we are asking the Government to consider other devices that may be used.
We have seen examples recently of how other devices have been used and we urge the Government to look at that before deciding what to do. Devices nowadays can do a lot more than make or receive calls; many can access the internet. There have been several incidents involving their use, which we need to consider carefully. Murderers have boasted about their life behind bars, which is something that no one in prison should be allowed to do. Imagine the victim or their relatives knowing that the murderer is boasting via the internet. We need to tighten up the law.
The law should stop such people flaunting their crimes and taunting the justice system. Only a couple of weeks ago, the murderer of Ben Kinsella updated his Facebook page, writing that he wanted a remote control to "mute or delete people" when he needed to. That is another example of how an electronic device can be used in prison to intimidate people outside. Less than two weeks ago, an arsonist serving an indefinite life sentence updated his Facebook page to describe a life of playing computer games, getting drunk on home-brew and enjoying sleep-ins-mocking the innocent victims of the crimes for which he was jailed. The Government should tighten up the provisions and extend the principle, so that not just mobile phones but other devices are covered. Recently, Ashley Graham in HMP Lindholme updated his Facebook page with:
"HMP Holiday's a place where men can come for a nice relaxin break from their moanin women and crying kids. No stress just rest."
Mark Elliot, who as part of a group savagely beat a father of three to death, also had access to Facebook via a phone, and updated comments and posted pictures. The problem is widespread.
People are put in prison to lose their freedom and be punished for the crime they have committed against society. It cannot be right to allow any prisoner easy access to people in the outside world, to communicate with them and perhaps work with them to commit other crimes or intimidate people. Prisoners should not be allowed the same freedoms that law-abiding people enjoy. That is a simple principle. I hope that the Government will take that into account, reconsider, and accept our amendment.

Tom Brake: I rise to speak in support of what I think may be a probing amendment to flush out the Government's thinking. If the Government seek to ensure that it is an offence to use telephones in prison because they are used to pursue criminal activities, thereby discouraging that use, they need to bear in mind that there are many other things that prisoners can and do use in prison for that purpose that can be just as harmful, as the hon. Member for Romford set out. A considered response is therefore required.
This may be another opportunity to briefly raise the fact that the most effective way of tackling the problem of telephone calls in prisons is a technical blocking device that can stop calls coming through, which is being investigated. I will listen with interest to why the Minister of State does not feel it necessary to extend the legislation to things such as Facebook, which are clearly used by criminals to pursue their criminal activities.

Douglas Hogg: I rise to support the amendment in its terms, but I am bound to say that I do not entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Romford. I hope he will forgive me if I explain why.
So far as the terms of the amendment are concerned, my hon. Friend is right. If the definition of the mobile telephone in some other piece of legislation is not sufficiently wide to encompass BlackBerrys, for example-one of which I hold in my hand and on which I have been busily communicating with various people during the Committee sittings-it should be wide enough in the Bill. We all use BlackBerrys and know that they can be used to communicate with the outside world. They are not, on the face of it, mobile telephones, unless there is a definition of which I am unaware. My hon. Friend is right to try to extend the definition to include BlackBerrys, laptops and other equipment that is capable of communication with the outside world.
Where I differ with my hon. Friend is as follows. I have a certain amount of experience here, as many years ago I was Prisons Minister for two years and I represent clients in prison, so I see a lot of prisoners. Over the past five years I have seen 50 or so prisoners, usually in prison, and I am familiar with prisons. One has to ask oneself an important question: what is the purpose of prison? The purpose is to punish, but the punishment lies in the deprivation of liberty. I do not believe that that extends to all the ordinary facilities of life. We are certainly not in the business of humiliating prisoners or depriving them of education and work more than need be, and it is terribly important that they retain contact with their families.
I absolutely agree with the proposition that prisoners must be prevented from running criminal activity from inside-that is clearly essential, and often requires the confiscation of all mobile telephones, so that prisoners cannot communicate with people outside. It is at least arguable that they should be prevented from using mobile communications to insult or humiliate people who have been affected by their crimes. That is an interesting proposition, which my hon. Friend made, in part, and I understand that some things that go on Facebook are abusive and might upset victims. However, we need to keep in mind that prisoners must be able to communicate with their families, and there are lots of activities on the internet-accessing information and learning-that I would want to encourage.
The secret lies in the phrase "without authorisation". New section 40D(3A) of the Prison Act 1952, inserted by the clause, refers to
"A person who, without authorisation, is in possession"
of such a device. It is a matter for the prison governor. He or she should have the ability to see what the prisoner is using the communication device for. If the prisoner is using it for any of the purposes that we have identified as being profoundly wrong, such as organising crime outside, he should be stopped. If he is using it for the sorts of purpose that the prison governor deems to be offensive to the victim or whoever, he should be stopped. However, I do not accept the proposition that we should stop all possession, because that will lead to a greater punishment than I favour.

Andrew Rosindell: I respect entirely my right hon. and learned Friend's views. My concern is how such a situation could be monitored. When we have hundreds of prisoners in a jail, how is the prison governor expected to monitor the use of electronic devices? That question has to be answered. Although I agree wholeheartedly that prison should not be used to humiliate people and take away their dignity-they are entitled to a certain standard, as is every human being-I am not convinced about the use of Facebook and free access to the internet for non-educational purposes. Many people cannot use modern electronic devices because they cannot afford to do so. I think that many members of the public would be rather concerned if free access were to be allowed in prison.

Douglas Hogg: I do not twitter and I am not familiar with Facebook. I use e-mails, but I do not have a clue about Facebook and I do not know what one has to pay to twitter. Those things are slightly outside the scope of my knowledge, and I have not the faintest intention of acquiring such knowledge. However, I go back to the broad propositions. It is wrong that people should be able to organise crime from within; that clearly requires them, in certain circumstances, not to have access to electronic communications. I do not want them to say things on their electronic media that distress the victim; I agree with that. But I do not go much further than that. I do not want to restrict their ability to obtain information about prospective jobs or deprive them of the ability to learn about things that might be useful in later life. I certainly do not want to prevent them from maintaining contact with their families.
My hon. Friend made a perfectly fair point about monitoring. I accept that, and it is not easy, but we have to decide where the balance lies. My judgment is that it lies with the prison authorities. The prison governors and officers in charge of the prisoners have to form a view of the sort of characters they are dealing with, and generally speaking, they do. When a prisoner has been in prison a long time and has been reported on by officers over a period of time, they form a fairly clear view of what they are dealing with. It is less easy when people are being moved from prison to prison. I would leave it to the good sense of the governor, without adopting-I hope my hon. Friend will forgive me-the widespread objection that he has raised. I would try to confine my prohibition pretty narrowly.

David Hanson: I thank colleagues for their contributions to the debate. I have some sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Romford and I will certainly consider the amendment. Essentially, we need to provide sufficient scope to ensure that mobile phones and other electronic devices are not used by prisoners in prison. That is why, when I was the Minister responsible for prisons, like the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham was, I took through the Offender Management Act 2007, which banned mobile phones being imported into prison. We do not want a situation wherein prisoners, as well as maintaining contact with their families, which is a noble cause, can undertake communication with the outside world that is intimidatory and threatening, and where murders have been commissioned from prison by prisoners using mobile phones. That is not acceptable, so we need to close that loophole.
That is why this is not only a question of mobile phones being imported into prison and the Offender Management Act 2007; it is about closing the loophole so that individuals caught in possession of a mobile phone in prison face an additional sentence, which is very severe, whether it involves custody and/or other potential measures.
There is great sympathy on that issue. If the hon. Gentleman withdraws the amendment, I shall consider the issue so that we can draft an amendment on Report that will catch up with a growing technology. When I was first elected to this place 18 years ago, my mobile phone was this big, and now it is that big-probably far too large; for the purposes of Hansard, I should say that it is 6 or 8 cm wide.

Simon Burns: Not inches?

David Hanson: I was going to talk in inches, but I thought that I would show myself as very old if I did that, so I resisted the temptation.
The key thing is the need to future-proof the situation to cover all the electronic technology that will undoubtedly develop in the next few years, which will affect mobile phone use. I shall happily look into the issue if the hon. Member for Romford withdraws the amendment.
The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington rehearsed an argument that we have wrestled with for years in the prison system: how do we block mobile phones as a whole? We have considered blockers, and have introduced body orifice security scanner, or BOSS, chairs. If we can, we shall, through the Ministry of Justice, consider the idea of telephone blockers, but the difficulty is that prisons are often in urban areas where, just over the wall, live people who have every right to use their phones, which could be blocked. We have been looking at the issue for some time. If the technology is appropriate, my colleagues in the Ministry of Justice will certainly consider it. We have even considered, through a range of activities, increased security and checks, and a range of measures in relation to imports, through the Offender Management Act 2007 and the Bill. We take the issue extremely seriously.
There are occasions when electronic equipment can be used for rehabilitation purposes. The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham is right: we want people to be able to use computers, think about rehabilitation and look at job opportunities. In prisons, that is undertaken in a controlled environment, under the auspices of the governor. There are controlled circumstances in which such access can happen. The provisions are essentially about stopping individuals from making contact from their cells, through mobile phones, to commission drugs, murder and intimidation.

Douglas Hogg: I agree with what the Minister of State and my hon. Friend the Member for Romford say about the undesirable use of mobiles or BlackBerrys, but can I pose a question on a matter of principle? The Minister said that he did not want such devices used in a cell. I understand that. However, if the mobile phone were being used exclusively to speak to the family-and this raises many difficult questions-would that be objectionable?
The answer may be that we cannot so confine it, or that we could not be so sure of the bona fides of the prisoner that we could permit that activity. However, what if those practical arguments-which are real and substantial-were stripped aside, to enable us to ask a narrow question? If we could confine the use just to calling the family, would that be wrong?

David Hanson: That poses enormous difficulties for security and the prison, and for the contact. Even if the right hon. and learned Gentleman were to suggest a list of five phone numbers for the family, there is no way in which we could assume that the person at the other end would be the one who should be contacted by the prisoner. It is very difficult to control the use of mobile phones in prison, and for security purposes it would in my view be pernicious to allow their use.
There are methods for contact with families, through personal visits, and there are regular numbers that can be put through normal phones that are available on wings in prisons. It would be very difficult to give sensible consideration to the right hon. and learned Gentleman's proposal given the security issues in a place that is, as the hon. Member for Romford said, ultimately about punishment as well as reform and rehabilitation. It would be very difficult to undertake.

Tom Brake: To return briefly to the issue of blocking, will the Minister confirm whether there are time scales during which the blocking technology is being reviewed, and whether there is an implementation programme? He might need to write to members of the Committee about that.
I had a conversation with someone who, until recently, was a prison governor at one of the large London prisons. His view was that the technology worked and that it was more a question of cost than of whether the technology was effective.

David Hanson: I left the Ministry of Justice about nine months ago when it was trialling the position on potential mobile phone blockers. It is an expensive business, but the principle is that if we can do it, we should. For me and for the Ministry of Justice, the question was whether we could make the blockers effective so that they worked in prisons. We need that element of security to know, first, that the technology works in prisons, and secondly whether it would have an impact outside prison. Both points are genuine issues that were being looked at in the trial.

Douglas Hogg: I have a lot of sympathy with the context of the blocker. However, let me say to the Minister of State that when I go into prisons, which I frequently do, I surrender my mobile, which is put into a secure box before I go into the secure area. However, the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington might wish to bear in mind that outside the secure area, but within the prison, we do use our mobiles to contact solicitors or families, or to call a taxi and those sorts of things. That might be an obstacle to the use of the blockers. Once someone is inside the secure area, that is one thing, but they could be just outside it, where hitherto we have all used our mobiles.

David Hanson: The key point is ensuring that the technology works. If it works, it will be looked at. The trialling has been ongoing. We are looking, and have been looking, for a solution, and if we can block signals in a defined area we should do so. However, I do not need to remind hon. Members that Wandsworth prison, Wormwood Scrubs, Liverpool prison in my neck of the woods, and Manchester prison are all next door to residential areas. So is Wakefield prison.

Simon Burns: Chelmsford.

David Hanson: Indeed-so is Chelmsford prison in the hon. Gentleman's constituency. I had the pleasure of visiting about 50 prisons during my time as Minister, and I rarely went to a rural location. Most prisons are in neighbourhoods and sometimes have people living close by them in flats. The issue is difficult; we need to find a technological solution that works.
The solutions that we have brought forward have introduced scanners for when people enter prison and increased security measures, training for staff and severe penalties for when, occasionally, mobile phones are brought into prison. Two years ago, a provision was introduced under the Offender Management Act 2007. It means that if someone does manage to smuggle a phone into the prison, through whatever means, or if they are caught with a mobile phone in prison-and I could widen that to include the amendment that looks at electronic communication devices-they will face an additional custodial sentence. That has to be a deterrent.
If I am honest, even with that measure there will be occasions when people will try to get mobile phones. Once this legislation is passed, there will still be those who think that doing so is worth the risk in order to run their businesses from prison or to continue intimidation from prison. We must be continually vigilant.
I cannot guarantee that this clause will stop every mobile phone from getting into prison. However, I can say that we are stopping mobile phones from getting into prisons and that if individuals are found in prison with such a device, they will face a custodial sentence. They will go before the courts; ultimately, people will find themselves facing penalties if they are caught.
We must do what we can to reduce the use of mobile phones in prison, not because we want to deny people family contact, but because mobile phones in prison are by and large used for purposes that are not supported by the state and the Government. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

Andrew Rosindell: I thank the Minister of State and I hope that the Committee has been reassured by his comments. He has accepted that it is possible for other modern electronic devices to be used to communicate for illegitimate purposes outside prison, and I am pleased that he has said that the loophole should be closed. On the basis that the matter will be looked at closely and considered in the way that has been outlined, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 41 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 42

Offence of allowing minors access to air weapons

Andrew Rosindell: I beg to move amendment 174, in clause 42, page 83, line 33, leave out 'take reasonable precautions to'.
We have moved swiftly to the subject of air weapons. Once again, it is an area where I am sure there will be a degree of consensus. It is absolutely right that no young person, whether they are 18 or 14, should have access to an air gun or a weapon of any kind. An adult or older person must ensure the protection of that child in respect of the use of that air gun, and that it is properly monitored.
Sadly, we have seen many accidents in which a young person's managing to obtain an air gun or weapon of some sort has led to the deaths of either themselves or somebody else. There will be no argument from this side of the House about the need to stop young people from using such weapons.
I would like to give one or two examples. Last March, a teenage boy died after being shot with an air rifle in a tragic accident while doing target practice in his back garden. In 2007, Mitchel Picken, who was only 12, was shot dead when his friends were playing with the family air rifle. One has to ask oneself what a family rifle was doing in the garden where very young people were playing games. No responsible adult should ever allow that situation to come about. Another example is from the same year. Danny Marsh, aged 17-slightly older-was supposedly larking around with two friends when their air gun went off accidentally and killed him. That is where any right-minded person would want to see a tightening up of the law.
However, if we are to tighten the law, we must ensure that we do it in a practical and enforceable way. My concern about the clause is with the words "take reasonable precautions"; that is why I tabled the amendment. How is that to be done? I fear that putting those words in the Bill weakens the position. It is better to make it absolutely clear that it is the duty of the adult to prevent such an incident from happening, rather than to take precautions.
An adult may claim that he has taken precautions when he may not have taken nearly enough. Who is to judge what that phrase means? Unfortunately, although the principle of the clause is, I think, supported by everyone in the room, the fact that the words "take reasonable precautions" are in the Bill weakens the clause and will not lead to what we want to see-the end of accidents of this nature. I hope the Minister will consider my point. The amendment would strengthen the legislation, rather than allow it to be weaker, which is what it is as it stands.

Douglas Hogg: I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Romford will not take it personally when I say again that I disagree with him. It is becoming a pattern of mine, and I apologise to him. I hope that he will forgive me if I explain my reasons.
I hold a .22 rifle and several shotguns, and I am duly certificated in respect of all of them. They are held in a steel cabinet. Within the cabinet are a couple of airguns, which I have had since I was a boy. The steel cabinet is locked. We have to dispose of the keys somewhere, but let us assume that a young person finds them, opens up the steel cabinet and takes out the airgun. Is it right that I should be liable under criminal law, having locked the cabinet and put away the keys securely? The answer is manifestly no; I would have taken reasonable precautions as required by the police. The fact that my precautions were undone by a devious juvenile should not make me liable for a criminal offence.
If we accept the suggestion of my hon. Friend the Member for Romford, we would be adopting the principle of what is known as either strict or absolute liability. As a general proposition, I am against strict or absolute liability and I would confine it to the most particular and special of circumstances. I hope that he will reflect that, while some of his examples are perfectly sound, most people-like myself-actually lock up their airguns, although it is not a strict requirement. We keep them in steel cabinets and that seems as much as we can reasonably be expected to do.

Andrew Rosindell: My right hon. and learned Friend makes a good point, but my examples are not relevant to it. The guns were not locked away. If the matter ever went to court, any reasonable judgment would be that, if the owner of the gun had locked it in a cabinet and the keys had been stolen, the act would not be considered irresponsible if the owner had taken such precautions.

Douglas Hogg: Forgive me, but my hon. Friend is misunderstanding the nature of his amendment. If it were accepted, the Bill would state that
"It is an offence for a person in possession of an air weapon"-
such a gun, when in a steel cabinet, is probably in my possession-
"to fail to prevent any person under the age of eighteen from having the weapon with him."
My hon. Friend would be removing the "reasonable precautions" requirement to say that any failure amounts to an offence. In the circumstances that he clearly outlined to the Committee, the owner of the gun failed to take reasonable precautions. If we leave a gun lying around in our room, but someone takes it and shoots a duck or, much worse, a person, there has been a failure to take reasonable precautions. All such people are caught under what is proposed. I am worried about the person whose reasonable precautions were got round by the young person, but who is still made liable. That cannot be right.

Alan Campbell: The clause is all about prevention. I am heartened to hear the reassurance from the hon. Member for Romford, who is leading for the Opposition, that he shares our ambition to ensure that weapons that can on occasion cause harm do not get into the wrong hands. I am grateful for his offer of consensus with our aim.
I have two points to make about the effect of amendment 174. Clause 42 requires people to take reasonable precautions to prevent young people from gaining unauthorised access to weapons. The amendment would remove the requirement for reasonable precautions to be taken. That would shift the effect of the offence because it would apply only after a young person had gained access to an air weapon, and that could mean that the damage, including a fatality, had taken place. That is not acceptable.
We want to prevent the damage from being done in the first place, an ambition that I am sure the hon. Gentleman shares. I am in favour of using the law as a deterrent. The offence as he would like to amend it could provide some kind of deterrent, but we want the police to be able to take preventive action where they encounter an unsecured air weapon, rather than wait for a young person to pick it up and risk a tragic accident. I am sure that that would be an unintended consequence of his amendment, but we do not want to wait for the accident or the damage before action is taken.
On the second point, I agree entirely with the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham and he argued very well from personal example. The amendment would mean that an offence would be committed irrespective of any safekeeping measures taken by the owner. We could end up with an injustice whereby someone takes every reasonable step possible, including locking up the weapon in a cabinet, and then somebody gains access to the keys, opens the cabinet, takes the weapon out and causes damage. Therefore, it is our view that the offence ought to be based on the failure to take reasonable precautions. We believe that that would be both a fairer and more proportionate response to the dangers we have mentioned, and would not put such people, whom the right hon. and learned Gentleman made a very responsible plea for, in that position.
On the basis that the amendment would have unintended consequences and could penalise those whom we do not seek to penalise, I hope the hon. Member for Romford will withdraw it.

Andrew Rosindell: I thank the Under-Secretary for responding to what was a probing amendment. I felt it necessary to raise the issues and have a debate, albeit brief, and it has been a valuable discussion. I will withdraw amendment 174, but I urge him to consider the definition of taking responsible precautions and how that will be interpreted. Every one of us in the Committee Room wants every possible precaution to be taken to ensure that a death in this way never occurs again.
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Douglas Hogg: I beg to move amendment 142, in clause 42, page 83, line 34, leave out 'eighteen' and insert 'fourteen'.
I have a feeling that my hon. Friend the Member for Romford is not going to agree with me on this amendment. I might sound a bit old-fashioned about all this, but I think I had my first gun-a single-barrel shotgun, 16. bore-when I was 10. My father was a lawyer and well acquainted with the need to maintain public safety, but he had not the slightest inhibition about giving me that gun for my 10th birthday. I had an airgun, certainly access to an airgun, at about the same age. It is important to keep in mind that at the age of 18 young people can be serving in Afghanistan with modern weaponry on the front line, yet we are saying that, in effect, a person of 18 should not have access to an airgun.
Let us be clear about this. I accept that there are powerful airguns, especially those that are pump operated; I also accept that some are capable of a high penetrative power. Most airguns are not capable of that, although they can cause serious injury-I do not dissent from that view. They are the first weapon people have when they learn to use guns. In the end it is a matter of judgment. I think that 18 is far too old. I made the point that 18-year-olds are serving in Her Majesty's forces in Afghanistan using the most modern weaponry. To then say that that is the age necessary to justify possession of an airgun is, frankly, disproportionate. Whether I am right in saying that 14 is the right age when I had an airgun at 10 is a matter of debate, but I am quite clear that 18 sets the age barrier far too high.

Alan Campbell: We established in the previous debate that the point of the measures we are introducing is to safeguard people from accidents involving air weapons; we are in common agreement about the need for that. I felt from the right hon. and learned Gentleman's remarks that we were in danger of rerunning earlier debates about the age at which it would be appropriate for someone to have unsupervised possession of an air weapon. Parliament has decided that. The age of 18 was set in the Violent Crime Reduction Act 2006, which was implemented in October 2007. I remember our long debates then, but Parliament decided that the age limit should be 18. That is notwithstanding the arguments about those who can use other weapons in theatres of war. That is why we have chosen 18. It is the age the law sets out for unsupervised possession of an air weapon.
However, we have stipulated certain circumstances in which people can use air weapons, but under controlled conditions. Someone under 18 can have access to an air weapon and use it when they are supervised by someone aged 21 or over; when they are engaged as a member of an appropriate, approved target-shooting club or in a shooting gallery; or, aged 14 or over, if they are on private premises with the consent of the occupier. Clause 42 will not affect those arrangements. Indeed, subsection (2) makes it clear that the new offence will not apply when the young person is authorised to have an air weapon with him in those circumstances.
The amendment would take away that precautionary element for people aged 15, 16 and 17. Our argument is quite simple: it is as appropriate to secure against improper use by a 15-year-old as by a 14-year-old. The potential for accident or misuse is the same, and that is why we resist the amendment. It is both logical and necessary to have an age limit of 18, and the safeguards should apply. Our proposal does not change the current arrangements for use by young people. Although he may not agree, I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.

Douglas Hogg: I do not disagree and I will withdraw the amendment, if only because I do not wish to suggest for a moment that there is any dissension on the Conservative Benches. I have a feeling that my hon. Friend the Member for Romford may not agree with me on this issue, in view of what he has said in other debates. As the Conservative party is entirely united on all major issues, this is not a moment to suggest otherwise. I therefore beg to ask leave-having said that, the Committee may deny me leave-to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 44

Extent

Amendments made: 125, in clause 44, page 84, line 37, at end insert-
'( ) Section [Material subject to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995] extends to Scotland only.'.

This amendment secures that NC19 extends to Scotland only.
Amendment 126, in clause 44, page 84, line 38, leave out 'Section 16' and insert
'Sections 16 and [Material subject to the Terrorism Act 2000 (Scotland)]'.

This amendment secures that NC20 extends to the whole of the United Kingdom: NC20 amends Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000, which has UK-wide extent.
Amendment127, in clause 44, page 85, line 3, leave out '18' and insert
'[Material subject to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (Scotland)]'.-(Mr. Alan Campbell.)

This amendment secures that NC21 extends to the whole of the United Kingdom: NC21 amends section 11 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, which has UK-wide extent.

Alan Campbell: I beg to move amendment 110, in clause 44, page 85, line 8, leave out 'and 40' and insert
'to [charges for vehicle release: appeals]'

This amendment secures that the amendments made to the Private Security Industry Act 2001 by the new clause relating to charges for vehicle release extend, like the rest of that Act, to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (though they have no practical application in Scotland).

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss Government new clause 10-Charges for vehicle release: appeals.

Alan Campbell: We return to wheel-clamping and the important matter of an independent appeals procedure. The Committee is well aware of our intentions in relation to wheel-clamping. The Security Industry Authority will issue licences to businesses and there will be a code of practice covering issues such as fees for clamp release, towing and impounding, rules on signage warning motorists that they risk being clamped, time limits for towing vehicles, and other conditions governing the circumstances in which a fee can be charged. It will also cover things such as methods of payment, record keeping and the proper consideration of complaints, which is a crucial part of our deliberations.
I want to make it clear that we would expect, as part of the code of practice, that individual businesses, as part of getting their licence, would have a complaints procedure. Therefore, if an individual was clamped and wanted to protest, their first port of call would be the company. However, as is the case with tickets, people sometimes want to go beyond the first level of complaint and seek an independent view of whether they have been clamped properly. We intend to establish an independent complaints procedure with adjudicators who are legally qualified. We have been looking, as I alluded to earlier when talking about my discussions with the Department for Transport, at whether we can piggyback on to an existing tribunal-there is one that deals with ticketing that has legally qualified adjudicators -or whether we can replicate one in a separate form. We accept the need for independent adjudicators. They will be legally qualified, but we have not exactly decided whether they will use the existing system or a new one.

Douglas Hogg: Now is the appropriate time to tax the Minister on the scope of the appeal-I am grateful, Mr. Cook, for your previous guidance.
Proposed new subsection (4) in new clause 10 deals with the grounds that may be relied upon. The Minister will note that they extend to the contravention of a code of practice together with the contravention of any requirement. What I do not see in that subsection is any general discretion given to the adjudicator-if that is the appropriate word-to determine whether it would be right in general terms to waive the charge. Is the adjudicator being given a general discretion to do what is fair, even when the act complained of does not necessarily constitute a breach of the code?

Alan Campbell: That is certainly our intention. The right hon. and learned Gentleman was not impressed when I suggested earlier that I would look at the issue, but I will look at it. We are absolutely determined that the system gives the rights and protection that motorists seek. There will be a series of things to which the adjudicator will be able to refer in the code of practice, but it would be perfectly reasonable if they were given some discretion, because every case that comes before them will be different in some way. It will not be a cheap system, and if we bring in legally qualified people, we should trust their discretion on such matters. I give the right hon. and learned Gentleman an undertaking that we will look at the issue in the continuing deliberations.
On funding, an independent appeals procedure will cost money. We propose that the scheme will be funded partly by the fees paid by the businesses themselves. When they get a licence, part of that will go towards the set-up costs of the appeals procedure. We also think it is right that, where the businesses lose an appeal, they should be responsible for its cost. They should not get away with the fact that someone has had to go through the appeals procedure to get back money that they should not have lost in the first instance.
I am quite open about this, so let me say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that we are also looking at whether there should be a small-a very small-administrative fee for people who take their case to appeal. We have to protect against vexatious appeals. If we have a system that is entirely open from the moment a vehicle is clamped to the end of the appeal, we have to ensure that people do not automatically decide to go through the appeals procedure. Because there will be an administration cost, we are looking at the possibility of a small fee, bearing in mind that if people win the appeal, they will get back a great deal more than that would cost.

Tom Brake: I think that I am right in saying that there is no fee for the parking adjudicator, so why in this case does the Minister consider that there might be vexatious complaints?

Alan Campbell: We have looked at this in detail. The main reason is scale. Around one in 10 of people who get parking tickets appeals first to the local authority and then, of that number, one in 10 takes it to the independent appeal. The extent of the ticketing system means that the local authorities can pay for the appeals procedure. We believe that the cost of the appeals procedure for wheel-clamping should be largely-perhaps entirely-met by the businesses themselves through the licensing system. The scale of the local authority set-up means there is a great deal more money compared with the wheel-clamping sector. That is why we were looking to piggyback on that system. We are looking to make the process as affordable as possible, even though we recognise that there could be some money involved. I want to reassure people that most of the cost of the appeal will fall on the businesses themselves. We are bringing the proposal forward in this way because it is a matter for continued discussion and consultation. Having an independent appeals system is very important and gives people confidence.
Amendment 110 ensures that the amendments made to the Private Security Industry Act 2001 providing for appeals against charges for vehicle release extend, like the rest of that Act, to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. As many people will know, however, Scotland bans wheel-clamping, so we are caught in a slight dilemma with regards to extension to other parts of the country. However, the existing wording of the Act means that Scotland will not be caught. It does not need to be, as it does not have wheel-clamping in such a way. However, as we heard in our earlier deliberations, clause 39 is not confined in its potential scope to that sector of the private security industry, since it allows for business licensing to be extended to other sectors. We want to leave the door open for the extension of other sectors, but we appreciate that measures on wheel-clamping will not be necessary for Scotland. With that, Mr. Cook, I hope the Committee will support our proposals.

Douglas Hogg: I welcome what the Minister has said and I accept his undertaking to think further about the point I made. One has to ask what criteria the adjudicator-the appellate authority-will have to consider at the appeal. At the moment, proposed new section 22A(4) of the 2001 Act is pretty narrow. It states that the grounds of appeal
"may include in particular...contravention of a code of practice"
and
"contravention of any requirement imposed by...this Act".
I would like to another provision to cover any other matter that, in the opinion of the adjudicator, makes it unfair to levy the charge.
The hon. Member for Winchester spoke this morning about his constituents who had their vehicles clamped as a result of the snowstorms. If, for example, we left our car in a private place because of the snow-because we could not move it-and it was clamped, we would probably be in breach of the requirements of the clamping authority or the owner, but it would be unfair to require us to pay. I can think of lots of other examples: we might leave our car in a pub car park and fall ill or something so that we could not remove the car immediately; or someone might nick our handbag that had the keys in it, so again we could not move the car. In such circumstances, we would be in breach of the requirements imposed by the occupier, but none the less it would be unfair-if we could justify and prove the facts-to require us to pay the charge.
It is probably important that the Under-Secretary reflects on the matter so that when the provisions are made by regulation, the adjudicator will have sufficient discretion to waive the charge when in her or his opinion levying that charge would be unfair.

Alan Campbell: Proposed new section 22A(4) states:
However, I take on board what the right hon. and learned Gentleman says. The list is not exhaustive by any means and I shall see what we can do to reassure him.

Douglas Hogg: I accept that the list is not exhaustive, but the problem is that it rather points to some procedural defect. I want to see some form of general discretion appearing in the regulations.

Alan Campbell: I understand that point, which is why I have given the right hon. and learned Gentleman such reassurance. However, we have to be careful, because the companies need to know where they are too. If they are carrying things out, they need to know that, while there might be some discretion, they would not be put in the position of genuinely thinking that they were acting within the scope of the code of practice only for someone else to come along later and rule that they were acting outwith what would be, if not the code of practice, a test of reasonableness. I am sure that we can deliberate and see if we can come up with better wording, especially as the matter will be dealt with in regulations.

Andrew Rosindell: The inclusion of an independent adjudicator appeals process is something that the Opposition have argued for and supported from day one. We are pleased that it has now been included in the Bill. However, I want to make one or two points.
First, from studying new clause 10, I notice that on numerous occasions the word "may" is used in proposed new section 22A. For example, proposed new subsection (3) states that "appeal may be made", while proposed new subsection (4) states that "grounds may include". Is that word strong enough? If the legislation is to be effective-we all hope it is, because we have debated at length how much of an issue it is to our constituents-is the word "may" as strong as it needs to be? Should not the word "shall" be substituted for it in certain cases, when appropriate?
I also wish to respond to some of the points made by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. I agree with him about the situation if people are unable to access their vehicle through no fault of their own, such as because of bad weather. The hon. Member for Winchester made an important point earlier about people's vehicles being immobilised because of snow, and yet being clamped. Any code of practice ought to take such circumstances into account. However, I slightly disagreed with my right hon. and learned Friend when he mentioned people falling ill. If they park in a pub, as he mentioned, and then are ill, we may wonder why they have become ill, so perhaps the legislation should not be quite so lenient in such circumstances.

Douglas Hogg: That would be a matter for the adjudicator.

Andrew Rosindell: Indeed, and that is why it is important that the adjudicator has flexibility and is able to judge fairly and take into account all the circumstances while not letting people get away with parking illegally and ensuring that clampers do not use the power they have via the licence to clobber people and extort money unfairly. On that basis, I have no doubt that Members of the House, local authorities and all those engaged in this aspect of legislation will be consulted to ensure that the provisions are effective. Hopefully, MPs' case loads will then be much smaller, as our constituents will not have to complain so regularly.

Tom Brake: If the Government go down that route, an independent adjudicator will be required, and I hope that he or she will be as effective as the parking adjudicator, whose role is widely recognised as positive and independent. The Under-Secretary raised the issue of a small charge being levied, and the only word of caution that I have for him is that the charge should not be at such a level as to discourage people from pursuing an appeal if they feel that they have been wrongly clamped.

Alan Campbell: In response to the hon. Member for Romford's point about the use of the word "may" in proposed new subsection 22A(3), we say that the regulations shall specify the grounds on which an appeal may be made because we hope that people will not need to make an appeal. We leave the door open for that, but we hope that there will be no need to appeal when the regulations are in operation.
The use of the word "may" in proposed new subsection 22A(4) goes back to what I told the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham: the list is not prescriptive. We need to make regulations, which is why "may" is there, but there will be requirements and the regulations will be clearly set out. I shall certainly take on board what he has said.
The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington has no great enthusiasm for the system that we are introducing, but he is right that an independent appeals procedure is needed. Although we are considering the possibility of the appellant paying, I am conscious of the hon. Gentleman's point, and we would not want to put people off appealing. However, if there was a clear way to proceed without any real thought about the cost, there would be a danger of the system being swamped, and we must be careful to prevent that from happening. I acknowledge what he said about the parking adjudicator, which is why we are trying to get as close as possible to that model.

Tom Brake: The Under-Secretary has clearly stated that deliberations are going on about the charge. Has any figure come forward?

Alan Campbell: I cannot give the hon. Gentleman a figure. I am talking first about the principle of whether we have a charge and then about the general commitment to the bulk of the cost falling throughout the system on the businesses themselves, which, after all, are making the profits. I give the hon. Gentleman the undertaking that if we were to go down that route, the charge would be as small as possible, while nevertheless having the effect of sending out a message about vexatious claims.

Douglas Hogg: There is a lot to be said for the proposition that the unsuccessful party should pay the charges. If private motorists fail, will there be a charge on them? There is a justification for that: it would prevent vexatious appeals.

Alan Campbell: We considered that, but not for long. In having one's car released and going through the appeals procedure, there is still the risk of facing a hefty bill that would be disproportionate. The process will not come without a cost. We therefore accepted the principle that the businesses should pay. I understand what the right hon. and learned Gentleman is saying, and there is some logic to his suggested system. To avoid the kind of situations that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington hopes that we can avoid, we alighted on the notion of an administrative fee and people should not be expected to pay the full cost of the appeal. We have to get the balance and the proportion right, which is where we are heading.

Amendment 110 agreed to.

David Hanson: I beg to move amendment 111, in clause 44, page 85, line 11, at end insert-
'( ) Sections [Introductory] to [Parliamentary control] (compensation of victims of overseas terrorism) extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.'.

This amendment secures that the new provision relating to compensation of victims of overseas terrorism extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendment 112.
Government new clause 11-Introductory.
Government new clause 12-Compensation scheme.
Government new clause 13-Eligibility and applications.
Government new clause 14-Payments.
Government new clause 15-Claims officers etc.
Government new clause 16-Reviews and appeals.
Government new clause 17-Reports, accounts and financial records.
Government new clause 18-Parliamentary control.
Government new schedule 1-Compensation of victims of overseas terrorism: consequential amendments.
Government amendment 113.

David Hanson: The amendments and proposed new clauses and schedule provide the framework for a compensation scheme for the victims of overseas terrorist attacks, as announced by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on Second Reading. Self-evidently, we are introducing the provisions because we wish to ensure that the British victims of overseas terrorist attacks have support from the Government on similar terms to victims of terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom.
Hon. Members will be aware that we have had a criminal injuries compensation scheme for some years. However, it covers only the victims of violent crime, including terrorism, in Great Britain, while a separate scheme operates in Northern Ireland. That has led to a great deal of unfairness, which we seek to address today. We hope never to have to use the provisions, because we hope to prevent further terrorist attacks. A victim of a terrorist attack in this country will be compensated, whereas a British citizen who is the victim of a terrorist attack overseas may have no realistic prospect of securing comparable compensation in the country concerned.

Douglas Hogg: I ought to know the answer to this, but I have not checked the new clause. If the British citizen secures compensation abroad, either from a comparable scheme or, I suppose, through civil litigation, is credit given to the British compensatory authority, so that there is no double recovery?

David Hanson: Yes, and I am grateful to be able to clarify that for the right hon. and learned Gentleman.
Sadly, there have been some serious terrorist attacks overseas that have impacted on British citizens: the Bali attack in 2002, the Sharm el-Sheikh attack in Egypt in 2005, and the latest attack, which we can recall vividly, took place in Mumbai in 2008, when British citizens were, or could have been, killed or injured. The people involved in such attacks are often targeted simply because they are British citizens or western, and we need to bring the compensation scheme in line to reflect that, whether or not they are indiscriminate terrorist activities.
The new victims of overseas terrorism compensation scheme will broadly mirror the domestic criminal injuries compensation scheme. In particular, I envisage that the compensation awarded under the overseas scheme will be calculated on the same basis as the compensation payable under the domestic scheme in force at the time of an overseas terrorist attack. As with the domestic scheme, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, based in Glasgow, will administer the victims of overseas terrorism compensation scheme. Under the existing domestic scheme, adopted in 2008, awards are calculated according to the seriousness of the injury or injuries sustained and, where appropriate, loss of earnings and special expenses.
The trigger for the new scheme will be the designation, by the Foreign Secretary, of an overseas terrorist attack. Such designations will be only for the purposes of the scheme. In deciding whether to designate an attack, the Foreign Secretary will take into account all relevant factors, including-this is an important factor-whether the Foreign Office had advised against travel to the area where the attack took place.
As we are dealing with overseas terrorist attacks, we believe that the focus of the scheme should be on compensating British citizens. In addition to British citizens, we will also cover, in fulfilment of our European treaty obligations, EU and EEA nationals with sufficient connections to the United Kingdom. We are currently considering what the eligibility criteria should be.
The proposed national statutory scheme will take effect, in the event of Royal Assent, from 18 January 2010, which was the date of the Bill's Second Reading, when my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary announced the new scheme. I hope that it will be a positive development from 18 January. Many British citizens have been victims of terrorist attacks in recent years, some of which I referred to earlier, such as those in Sharm el-Sheikh and Bali. They continue to face hardship as a result of the ongoing consequences of a disability arising from injuries that they sustained in those terrorist attacks. Such victims will not be able to claim compensation under the statutory scheme provided for in the new clauses. We have concluded that if the scheme is enacted, we should also provide some financial recompense to those victims who continue to live with the consequences of the injuries that they sustained. It is important that we recognise that, although we cannot make clauses retrospective.
Accordingly, my right hon. Friend the Justice Secretary has established a time-limited scheme open to those eligible who were injured in designated terrorist attacks abroad since 1 January 2002. He will develop and establish a scheme following Royal Assent. I should stress that that will be a wholly separate arrangement from the new statutory scheme. We will not be retrospectively legislating on these matters, but we feel that awards payable under the time-limited scheme should be made. In these circumstances, the awards payable will be put in place by my right hon. Friend the Justice Secretary. There will be no awards to those who were bereaved in past attacks or to those who were injured and have now recovered. I accept that that will be a difficult situation for many individuals, but we will ensure that for those with an ongoing disability, one-off payments will be made, calculated by reference to the tariff based on the seriousness of the injury or injuries that we have indicated in previous discussions today. No payment will be made for the loss of earnings or special expenses. That will be a disappointment-I accept that it will be difficult-but I hope that the Committee will accept that we are legislating for a new scheme from January and that we are making strenuous efforts to ensure that we can help individuals who have ongoing difficulties.

Douglas Hogg: May I make one point, which, I am sure, the Minister already has in mind? It is important that the sums payable under the scheme should not exceed the sums available to members of the armed services who are injured in conflict. If that were to happen, there would be a terrible row. People are rightly very sensitive about compensation payable to servicemen, and there would be the most appalling row if servicemen received less compensation than other British citizens who are injured overseas.

David Hanson: As I have said, any payment made will be on par with a tariff, which is a well-established practice to date. My understanding is that that will not be higher than individual service awards. I will certainly take those points on board and reflect upon them in due course. I am advised that the armed forces scheme is even more generous than the criminal injuries compensation scheme. There is no opportunity for an overlap, which would be detrimental to those brave individuals who serve in our armed forces. We aim to establish the time-limited scheme for victims of attacks since 2002 as quickly as possible once we have enacted the statutory scheme. I hope that that will be helpful.
I hope that the Committee will agree to the new clauses and amendments. I hope that we never have to implement the provisions, for the simple reason that we do not wish terrorist attacks to occur. None the less, I hope that the Committee will recognise that the Government have made an effort to ensure fairness for those who may be injured in terrorist attacks, and to offer some help to those who have ongoing difficulties as a result of terrorist attacks.

James Brokenshire: I share the Minister's sentiment when he said that we hope that the provisions outlined in the new clause will not be necessary; if they are, it will mean that some form of terrorist action will have taken place overseas and that British people will have been caught up in it. However, the sad reality is that it may happen, and I note the sensitive way in which the Minister approaches the matter.
For me, the Second Reading debate was marked by the contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Ellwood), whose brother was caught up in one such terrorism atrocity. That highlighted the personal issues that can result from those appalling actions, and the impact they can have. We obviously support the work of our security services, our armed forces and the other law enforcement agencies in seeking to ensure that our fellow countrymen and women are protected against such appalling actions.
We recognise the call for support made by those who fall victim to appalling acts of violence abroad who would have received a financial contribution if those acts had occurred in this country. I hear what the Minister said about the new provisions and, as I said on Second Reading, we will reflect closely on them.
I note that the Government have considered the matter and have moved from their previous approach of suggesting that a statutory compensation scheme for British victims of overseas terrorism was not necessary because European legislation required member states to apply compensation to any victims of terrorist acts within their territories. That goes only so far. A number of incidents have occurred outside the bounds of the European Union and the European economic area, and it is in that context that the Government have reflected on the representations made to them and have proposed the scheme outlined in the new clauses.
The provisions were initially announced in a Ministry of Justice press release, and the Home Secretary noted on Second Reading that the Government would be bringing forward proposals. As the Minister said, the scheme is intended to apply not only to UK nationals but to nationals of other EU member states and other countries in the EEA that have sufficient connection with the United Kingdom. I assume that will be based on shared arrangements in meeting treaty obligations, and that we will almost have reciprocity-the arrangements possibly being utilised by other member states.

Douglas Hogg: Could one not be more robust? We could say something to the effect that citizens of an EU state should not be entitled to make a claim under the scheme unless the state to which the claimant belonged had a reciprocal arrangement that would enable UK citizens to make a claim.

James Brokenshire: As always, my right hon. and learned Friend makes an important point. If individual schemes operate in other EU member states, is there some ability to share in any payments that are made? Should there be some sort of credit? How would individual schemes operate across the EU? If a resident of another EU state is entitled to claim under the UK scheme, should there be an arrangement to seek recompense from that other member state, so that there is a level playing field across the EU? It would be interesting to hear from the Minister on that point about the application of the scheme.
Clearly, the proposal is intended as a fall-back or safety net for when the country where the incident has occurred does not fulfil its European or international obligations. We seek assurances that all steps will be taken to ensure that countries do not ignore their responsibilities under their own schemes. It is interesting to note, for example, that in 2008-09 awards to the value of £539,491 were made under the criminal injuries compensation scheme to overseas residents who were victims of terrorism in the UK. The UK is clearly meeting its responsibilities in that regard, and it is important to ensure that other countries step up to the plate and similarly respect their liabilities and responsibilities. I will listen carefully to how the Minister envisages the operation of the scheme in that context, and to what discussions he has had with colleagues about the international application of the relevant procedures.
It would also be interesting to hear whether the Minister has had any discussions with the insurance market about terrorism exemptions in insurance policies, and about the interrelationship of the proposed scheme with other insurance that may or may not be available. From what he has said to my right hon. and learned Friend, I imagine that the Minister envisages that if payment is received from other sources, it would act as a credit against sums or payments that might be due under the scheme. It is important to understand that better. Equally, if payment is made under the scheme, and further subsequent payment is made either by the host country or other sources, how is it envisaged that that would operate in practice?
As we understand from statements in the Ministry of Justice press release, and from what the Minister has said, it is intended that the scheme be administered by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, based in Glasgow. The Minister may be aware that in the recent past, that organisation has come in for scrutiny and some criticism by the Public Accounts Committee. A PAC report made 14 recommendations relating to the performance of the criminal injuries compensation scheme. For example, the PAC highlighted issues such as the fact that some of the forms needed to use plain English, that some applicants felt that they needed to be legally represented in order to make an application and receive compensation from the CICA, and that there were performance issues regarding the answering of telephones. Obviously, if we now add the new requirements for victims of overseas terrorism to the obligations, responsibilities and administration of the criminal injuries compensation scheme and the authority, it would be helpful to know how the CICA has responded to previous criticisms.
I know that the Ministry of Justice had been seeking to set up action plans to respond to the criticisms made by the PAC and, through the Committee, the National Audit Office. We are trying to ensure that should the scheme come into effect, and compensation is due to those who suffer horrendously from incidents abroad, the process should be clear and understood, and that no obstacles should be put in the way by the operation or administration of the CICA. Therefore, it will be helpful to hear from the Minister how the authority is responding. How does he anticipate that the CICA will operate under the scheme to ensure that claims are made as painlessly as possible in terms of paperwork, and that claimants can contact the CICA for advice, guidance and assistance getting through the process, without feeling that recourse to legal advice is necessary?
The Minister said that the levels of compensation will, in broad measure, reflect the existing criminal injuries compensation scheme. Will certain exclusions apply to the operation of the new scheme, similar to those that apply in the existing scheme? New clause 13 states:
"The Scheme may make provision about a person's eligibility for a payment under it by reference to any or all of the following factors",
including
"any other factors that the Secretary of State considers appropriate".
My understanding is that under the criminal injuries compensation scheme, there could, for example, be a question about whether a previous conviction was relevant in deciding about the award of a payment. It would be helpful to understand what is meant by the detail of the proposed scheme-whether it will reflect principles similar to those in the existing one.

Douglas Hogg: That is an important point. It would help us if the Minister could amplify on it. I do not want to disqualify someone simply because they have a criminal conviction in the past, but if a person happened to be, for example, running drugs when he was caught up in an explosion, I would not be sympathetic to his claim for compensation. That is the sort of issue that has to be spelt out.

James Brokenshire: My right hon. and learned Friend is absolutely right. The Minister has set out the broad mapping of how he envisages the operation of the scheme. He said that it would broadly follow the existing criminal injuries compensation scheme. That is helpful, but it would be even more helpful if it was set out in further detail.
My right hon. and learned Friend made an important point that I was intending to raise-the issue of service personnel. I understand that there was originally some delay in proposing the scheme regarding the interrelationship with the armed forces compensation scheme for the appalling incidents that we have seen in Afghanistan, such as roadside bombings, which could be considered terrorist insurgent action. How does the Minister see the interrelationship between the scheme for compensation for service personnel and this scheme? As I understand it, the proposed scheme is separate and would not apply to service personnel-they would be excluded because they are already entitled to apply to another scheme. There would thus be no overlap between the two schemes. It would be helpful to have it set on the record that that is the intention of the proposals.

Douglas Hogg: My hon. Friend is clearly right, but individuals such as journalists may be embedded with UK forces. Under which scheme will they make a claim? It is important that they do not receive more than service people.

James Brokenshire: The Minister says that he anticipates that the payments under the scheme would be less than those that go to service personnel. Obviously, there would be a need to spell out in the detail of the regulations and the scheme what exclusions would apply and, if someone were in a theatre of conflict, whether there would be application under one scheme or the other. It is just a matter of ensuring for definitional purposes that the details are made clear.
It is open to the Secretary of State, as stated under new clause 11, to make the requirements to designate whether a particular incident is to be covered under the scheme. We can debate if the provision is too loosely worded about whether the Secretary of State may or may not designate, although I appreciate that certain facts and circumstances might need to be established if something is to be regarded as a terrorist incident. That is why defining the scheme and the application of new clause 11 will become important.

Douglas Hogg: May I try something out on my hon. Friend? There will be several situations in which people-journalists or whoever-are working in conflict or danger zones as part of their job. There would be a case for saying that such persons should be required to take insurance so that the scheme can get the credit for the insurance payment. For example, it could be said that a journalist embedded with the forces should be insured against the damages that they suffer, otherwise the whole cost would fall on the scheme.

James Brokenshire: Hence the reason for my earlier comment to the Minister about what consideration he had given to the availability of insurance. In certain circumstances, people might not be able to obtain cover in the insurance market and, in that context, perhaps the Government would consider the scheme as the safety net. The point about credits or recompense through other routes is relevant and one that we have touched on in the debate, so it will be interesting to hear from the Minister about how that will operate in practice.
The Government have determined that they accept their moral obligation to recompense people caught up in acts of terrorism abroad, but they are not seeking to recompense victims of serious crime that is not terrorist action or atrocity. Will the right hon. Gentleman explain why the Government have sought to take the approach of looking at the criminal injuries compensation scheme and saying that they are prepared to accept it to a certain extent, but not in relation to other circumstances? It would be genuinely interesting to hear the Minister's thoughts about the logic and the process and how, in the terms of definition, an action could be a terrorist action or violent crime. Perhaps the Secretary of State will contemplate such matters by virtue of the provision embedded in new clause 11 that gives him discretion to decide whether something is caught by the scheme. It would be helpful to understand the limits and scope of what is intended, and the approach that has been taken.
I turn now to a couple of more detailed points about the new clauses. I understand that the provisions would not prevent ex gratia payments from being made, should the Government determine that appropriate. Subsection (3) of new clause 11 states that
"Nothing in this section affects any power of the Secretary of State to make payments to, or in respect of, persons who are injured as a result of terrorism outside the United Kingdom."
Does that still allow discretion for some element of ex gratia payment over and above the compensation scheme, or has that provision been included for another reason? I want to understand the logic that is being applied.
Going back to the point about the Secretary of State having discretion to decide whether it would be appropriate to designate the particular act to ensure that compensation would be payable under the scheme, what sort of factors does the Minister anticipate, because obviously the provision has been drafted with some thought? What sorts of exclusions are anticipated regarding reserving that right of the Secretary of State to determine that something should not be covered?
New clause 18 makes it clear that any scheme under these provisions would need to be laid before Parliament. What thought has been given to the pre-consultation that should be carried out in relation to the scheme? Once it is laid before Parliament, we would not be able to amend it under the anticipated procedures, so does the Minister plan to have a formal consultation procedure on the scheme to ensure that relevant points can be incorporated before it is finalised?

Douglas Hogg: May I make a further suggestion that my hon. Friend proposes to the Minister that it would be a good idea if the scheme could be debated in draft before it was laid in its final form before the House?

James Brokenshire: The Minister might be able to clarify this, but new clause 18 states that the scheme cannot be made unless a draft has been approved by a resolution of each House. Therefore, it seems that a draft would need to be laid and approved by both Houses before it could come into effect. The point that I was making was that the draft would be laid, but it could not be amended, so it would have to be accepted or rejected.

Douglas Hogg: I think that new clause 18 refers to the draft that becomes the final resolution. What sometimes happens, as my hon. Friend will know, is that Governments come forward with a draft that is debated, but not necessarily voted upon. The Government then take it away and incorporate into the final draft such changes as they deem appropriate as a consequence of the debate-that was what I had in mind.

James Brokenshire: Equally, my right hon. and learned Friend will be aware of the process whereby a Select Committee can consider a draft Bill or draft orders. I am trying to make the point that there should be an opportunity for debate to facilitate the best operation of the scheme and to ensure that relevant points can be fed into the process. The Minister might be planning a formal consultation period that would facilitate that and there might be some parliamentary involvement. Given the interest that many right hon. and hon. Members have in the subject, they may want to have such engagement. At the very least, there should be a process to facilitate such input to ensure that the scheme will be more effective and will take those issues into account.
I will listen carefully to what the Minister says in response to this debate because this is an important issue. We must reflect carefully on those people who have suffered in terrorist incidents overseas. There is an issue of fairness. If such an incident had occurred in the UK, they would be entitled to compensation, but because it took place overseas in a territory that does not have a scheme to provide compensation directly, there is a clear gap. I recognise the moral issue here, which I am sure is part of the reason why the Government have brought forward these proposals.

Tom Brake: I welcome the proposals, although I note the restrictions applying to retrospective compensation. When considering what compensation to provide, going back to 2002, were any estimates made of the number of people anticipating being included, but who are not included?
The hon. Member for Hornchurch raised a large number of interesting points about the way in which the proposals interlink with existing schemes-EU schemes, insurance schemes, and the interface with the service personnel scheme-and whether the principle of non-payment to people with previous convictions that applies in relation to criminal compensation is to be extended to this scheme. He raised a number of valid points to which I am sure that the Minister will want to respond.
I would like to echo another issue raised by the hon. Gentleman that is slightly outwith what we are debating, although I hope that you will allow me one or two sentences on it, Mr. Cook. The Government have established the principle of compensating British citizens who are victims of a heinous crime abroad-terrorism. The hon. Gentleman made a strong point about the deliberations the Government went through to arrive at the restriction to victims of terrorism abroad. The Minister might be aware of a case involving the son of one of my constituents who was attacked and seriously injured when he was on holiday in Malia in Crete. We had a meeting in Westminster a couple of weeks ago to look at the issue of victims of crime abroad. A regrettably large number of British citizens have been affected by crime in Greece. I would like to know whether the Government have considered taking the remit beyond victims of terrorism into other areas of serious crime. The Minister has a number of challenging points to respond to, but the principle he has set before us is one that I think all Members will support.

David Hanson: I am grateful for the broad level of support from the hon. Members for Hornchurch and for Carshalton and Wallington. They raised a range of points and I will try to respond in due course.
The compensation scheme is first and foremost designed for British victims and their families. I recognise that we have obligations under European Union treaties. Article 18 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union expressly states that we may not discriminate against citizens of other member states on the grounds of their nationality, and there is case law on that. Through the proposals I have brought before the Committee, we are trying to ensure that individuals from abroad who are eligible for this scheme should have strong links with the United Kingdom, and those strong links are defined by case law.
The hon. Member for Hornchurch mentioned the important point of travel insurance. Travel insurance is not designed to provide compensation in the way in which the scheme is designed to do. If I am asked the straightforward question of whether individuals should take out travel insurance, the answer is yes, they should. They should also check that it covers terrorist activity, which around a third of travel insurance schemes currently do. As I have already indicated, if alternative methods of finance are provided, the scheme will take that into account when determining the awards.
The hon. Member for Hornchurch asked whether the eligibility for criminal convictions would be similar. The existing UK criminal injuries compensation scheme will be the basis for the scheme operating abroad, which will have similar provisions.
The hon. Gentleman commented on the ability of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority to deal with the claims. I have every confidence that it will be able to do so. It aims to provide compensation as quickly as possible, not just as a matter of course but because it is important that the compensation goes to individuals who require it. Last year, the average time for the authority to decide an application was about nine months and 57 per cent. of applications were decided within eight months. To put that into context, last year 36,461 compensation awards were made in the UK, and since 2002 about 300 of our people have been killed or injured abroad because of terrorist activity. I hope that it never happens but, looking at past form, the increase in the authority's work load would be relatively minor and within its ability to cope.
A number of Members mentioned the armed forces compensation scheme, which is entirely separate from the victims of overseas terrorism compensation scheme. A member of the armed forces injured while on active service would expect to apply to the armed forces scheme and not to the victims of overseas terrorism compensation scheme. We had an interesting discussion about people who might be embedded within the armed forces, working for them as journalists or civilian contractors. We would expect contractors and journalists to be covered by private employer insurance schemes, and in the unlikely event that they were not, the Foreign Secretary would have to consider whether to include them in his designation of terrorist activity. To clarify, the Foreign Secretary, when determining a designation, will consider the identity of the attacker, the design and purpose of the attack, the nature and circumstances of the attack, and the broad thrust of why the attack took place.
The provision will allow ex gratia payments-payments to be made outside the scheme-which were again mentioned by the hon. Member for Hornchurch. An existing Ministry of Defence scheme and Foreign and Commonwealth Office exceptional assistance are both covered, and the Secretary of State for Justice will be able to introduce the arrangements that I mentioned on Second Reading for some of those injured since 2002.
Consultation was mentioned by both the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham and the hon. Member for Hornchurch. As I have said on numerous occasions, we are modelling the system on the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority scheme, which is a natural scheme in practice, and on which we do not need further consultation. We will lay draft orders before the House for approval or otherwise, and I do not want at this stage to commit to full-blown consultation. The principles are established and we do not consult on the current CICA scheme. Furthermore, I do not want to delay the introduction of the scheme. I want it to be operational for anybody who is a victim of a terrorist attack in the near future.
I am trying to think as quickly as I can to cover the points that have been mentioned. Overall, the scheme should be welcomed, and I commend it to the Committee.

Tom Brake: I think that the Minister was searching for some points to which he meant to respond. Both the hon. Member for Hornchurch and I asked what consideration the Government have given to extending compensation to victims of not just terrorism abroad, but other things such as serious crime.

David Hanson: The hon. Gentleman pins me down on an issue that I was not trying to avoid, but was not keen to explore in great detail. We have had to make some considerations on all the matters. Resources are always limited and we have to consider the issues in the round. We have determined that there is a difference between terrorist attacks at home and terrorist attacks abroad, and we have therefore decided to support the scheme. It is right that we should make provisions for British victims of terrorist attacks abroad.
There is a tangible expression of outrage when a terrorist attack occurs, and I recognise that such injuries need to be considered in detail. We have to consider the wider picture, however. I cannot give a commitment to extending the CICA scheme to victims of ordinary crime abroad. We have tried to make terrorism a special circumstance. I hope that the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington will accept that that is progress, even if he wishes us to pursue the matter further. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

Amendment 111 agreed to.

Alan Campbell: I beg to move Government amendment 175, in clause 44, page 85, line 11, at end insert-
'( ) Section [Power to restrict sale and supply of alcohol] (power to restrict sale and supply of alcohol) extends to England and Wales only.'

This amendment secures that NC10 extends to England and Wales only.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government new clause 31-Power to restrict sale and supply of alcohol.
Government amendment 176.

Alan Campbell: Government amendment 175 ensures that Government new clause 10 will extend only to England and Wales. Government amendment 176 is merely consequential. I hope that the Committee will forgive me for spending a little time speaking to these measures, as we did not have the opportunity to discuss the matter on Second Reading.
Government new clause 31 would amend the Licensing Act 2003 by inserting five new sections. New section 172A will provide licensing authorities, almost all of which are local authorities, with the power to ban sales or supplies of alcohol between 3 am and 6 am, either in the whole of its area or in a smaller, more confined part of it. The provisions require that such an order may not be made unless certain preconditions are met; I shall return to those shortly.
The effect of an order would be to override the effect of any premises licence, club premises certificate or temporary event notice otherwise authorising sales or supplies at that time in the early morning. We have chosen to restrict such bans to the period between 3 am and 6 am as a result of the findings of an evaluation of the 2003 Act that was published in March 2008. In a written statement to Parliament, the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), said of the 2003 Act:
"Its introduction has not led to the widespread problems some feared. Overall, crime and alcohol consumption are down. But alcohol-related violence has increased in the early hours of the morning and some communities have seen a rise in disorder."-[Official Report, 4 March 2008; Vol. 472, c. 102W.]
The evaluation reported an increase in the number of offences committed between 3 am and 6 am that was small in absolute terms, at 236 incidents, but large in proportionate terms at about 25 per cent. Our intention is not unnecessarily to restrict or inhibit the night-time economy, which is often important to local economies, but to focus sharply on the problem that has been identified.
Returning briefly to the preconditions, first, the order must be necessary for the promotion of one or more of the four statutory licensing objectives. I remind the Committee that they are: the prevention of crime and disorder; public safety; the prevention of public nuisance; and the protection of children from harm.
Secondly, new section 172B requires the licensing authority to advertise the proposed order and to consider at a hearing any relevant representations made to it by any of three different groups. The Secretary of State is empowered under the new section to prescribe the detailed procedure governing how and when relevant representations should be made and how they will be processed. Under the provisions, representations are relevant if they concern the likely effect of the order on the statutory licensing objectives, and are made in the prescribed form and within the prescribed time.
Of the three groups that may make representations, the first includes any persons affected by the order, which means the licence and club certificate holders, people who give temporary event notices, and the holders of provisional statements. The second group includes responsible authorities-for example, the police and environmental health officers. The third group comprises interested parties, including residents or other businesses in the vicinity of the affected premises. It also includes local councillors who are members of the licensing authority. Where no relevant representations are received, the licensing authority will be free to make the order it had proposed and advertised, but, where representations have been received, the licensing authority must hold a hearing before finalising its decision. The arrangement for such a hearing will be set out in the regulations.
The legislation was passed in 2003 and came into force in November 2005, so it has been in force for more than four years. At the time it was enacted, the Government promised to keep its impact under close scrutiny. The new measure is designed, in the light of our evaluation, to extend the powers that we originally gave to licensing authorities. The question has been asked whether we expect the power to be widely used. The answer is no, we do not. The 2003 Act has been a considerable success in many areas and we believe that the existing powers in the Act are sufficient in those areas. In other areas, however, we need to go further.
There are 378 licensing authority areas. In the case of public bars, pubs and nightclubs, some 73 per cent. of those licensing areas have either one or no premises licensed for 24 hours. Nationally, we believe that no more than 3 per cent. of licensed premises trade between 3 am and 6 am. That suggests that no more than 6,000 premises would be affected if every area made such an order, which is highly unlikely. Our approach, therefore, is targeted and proportionate.
Some local authorities, however, have more demanding night-time economies, and they tell us that they would welcome the power to manage crime and antisocial behaviour better, in the interests of their residents. There is a general principle that we wish to empower local people to have an even stronger say in what their towns and cities are like, particularly in the early hours of the morning. It is fair to ask, in anticipation, why we are not giving licensing authorities a free hand to set their own hours of closure when making orders. We believe that the measures are reasonable and proportionate. We do not want to create unjustified problems for businesses that are emerging from recession, or provoke job losses, unless there is a good, evidence-based reason.
As for why we are centring on the hours between 3 am and 6 am, a fixed closing time of 3 am minimises the disruption to businesses, with only those trading between 3 am and 6 am potentially affected. We believe that 3 am is late enough to allow closing times and departures from licensed premises to be staggered, which the police continue to value as a support for dispersing large numbers of people from city and town centres. Moreover, 3 am should be sufficiently late not to interfere with plans for wedding receptions and other special celebrations that may continue later than a normal evening's pleasure. At the other end of the closure period, 6 am allows people to sell alcohol with breakfast. It may come as a surprise to some that that is a habit, but I am told that champagne breakfasts sometimes have an appeal for tourists. People celebrating Christmas might also decide that they want a particularly early start, so 6 am offers that flexibility and allows the period for closure.
New section 172E will allow the Secretary of State to make an order exempting certain cases and circumstances from the effects of an order made under new section 172A. Those cases and circumstances will be defined in particular by reference to certain types of premises and certain days. On certain premises, hotels have always been free to supply alcohol to their residential guests, so we think that they should be exempt from the arrangements. Moreover, we would not want to exempt sales made to the general public at certain other premises. Warehouses to which the public have no access for purchasing alcohol, for example, hold 24-hour licenses and operate after 3 am. Such premises may be distribution centres for wine purchased over the internet or by mail order, with the goods sometimes starting their journeys in the small hours. We would expect such premises to be exempt because they do not present any obvious danger to the licensing objectives.
As for particular days, we would consider appropriate for exemption new year's eve every year and specific days such as the diamond jubilee weekend of 2012, for which occasion it might be suitable to exempt days, but-I stress this point-the effect would not be that all licensed premises can trade between 3 am and 6 am on the exempted days. The effect of an exemption would be that the normal permission for such licences and certificates would be in force. Thus, premises whose hours have always been restricted by their licences and certificates would continue to be restricted despite the existence of an exemption on the day or days.

James Brokenshire: I am gratified that the Minister had the good grace to accept that the provisions in the new clause are likely to have limited effect. I hope, for his sake, that they will not have the same limited effect as the new alcohol disorder zone provisions, none of which has been used at all.
I appreciate and recognise that the Government, by virtue of the provisions, accept that they got 24-hour licensing wrong. The Minister rightly identified the increase in violent crime between 3 am and 6 am-from the DCMS report-which is tantamount to admitting why the Government are introducing the new clause. They are right to take action. We have seen not just the rise in crime but the rise in hospital admissions of patients with an alcohol-related diagnosis-between 2004-05 and 2008-09 such admissions went up by 47 per cent. Similarly, the number of children admitted has risen, and death rates from alcohol have increased by 47 per cent. since 1997.
The provisions are an admission and recognition of the problems caused by the Government's approach. I appreciate what the Minister said about keeping things under review, but the situation is not one they have woken up to overnight, because the problems relating to the small hours of the morning were first identified in July 2007. Why have the Government taken so long to act? Furthermore, incidents that occur at that time are likely to be the result of drinking much earlier in the evening-the whole concept of pre-loading and the consumption of alcohol in the home. Although the problems might be exhibited in the hours between 3 am and 6 am, it does not mean that the alcohol was consumed then. When we understand that, we see a much wider problem than the Minister alluded to.
I have a few comments on the specifics of the new proposals, but I do not intend to use this afternoon's sitting for that wider debate, because it would not necessarily be appropriate or in order. However, proposed new section 172A in new clause 31, states:
"If the licensing authority considers it necessary for the promotion of the licensing objectives, it may"
take the relevant action. From what the Minister said, that appears to be tied to the four licensing objectives, but I want to understand that a little better. The DCMS press release of 4 February 2010 stated:
"Councils would need to show that the restriction was necessary to prevent crime and disorder or public nuisance or to promote public safety."
What obligation does that place on councils? Can they make a restriction if they consider it necessary, or must the necessity be demonstrated with objective evidence? In other words, is the provision likely to be fettered by guidance that would sit alongside it, which would make it very difficult for a council to show that evidence and to rely on the provisions set out in the new clause.
We have heard, in the review from the DCMS, that there were just 470 pubs, bars and nightclubs with 24-hour licences, but there was no evidence that more than a handful operate on that basis. If there were so few licensees trading or operating during that time, how would a council be able to demonstrate that the four criteria-the licensing objectives-would meet the hurdle that the Government appear to be setting up? Would it create a restriction on the utilisation of the powers, even if a council wished to do so? It is all very well putting down in legislation that new powers exist, but if the bar is set so high for councils to satisfy the relevant criteria-to go through the procedures that the Minister has alluded to-the likelihood is that they will not bother, even if they feel that it might be useful or helpful for them to do so.
The whole of that fettering-all the other arrangements that sit alongside the provisions-is germane. We have seen guidance fetter local councils in their ability to utilise the staggered arrangements alluded to by the Minister. In essence, the council always has to prove why a licence should not be granted, rather than a licensee having to prove why they should be granted the licence in the first place. It is about balance and discretion. Therefore, although I welcome and appreciate the fact that the Government recognise that a change needs to be made, the question is what impact it will have and whether the provisions will actually be used at all.

Tom Brake: The proposal is recognition that we are not yet ready for continental-style 24-hour licensing. The measures needed before that change were not in position. It is not entirely clear to me whether this change-the restriction that will now apply between 3 am and 6 am-will actually achieve what the Government intend. They have previously stated that the provision was to try to address peaks of violence associated with drinking. It is clear from evidence supplied from Guildford that the peaks of violence happen earlier than the 3 am to 6 am slot, so it will not address the problem in that city, or presumably in others.
Underlying the change is the need to deal with other fundamental problems of alcohol consumption that have not been addressed-pricing, promotions, advertising, the strength of alcohol and under-age drinking. Those are matters that I am sure we would all like to debate, Mr. Cook, but you would not allow us to do so. It is possible that the change will make a slight dent in the problems associated with irresponsible drinking, but I think it will be a slight dent only and there are still many major issues that we need to address.

Alan Campbell: I anticipated to some extent the points that the hon. Member for Hornchurch made. We had a fairly substantial rehearsal on the Floor of the House when we debated the programme motion. He cites alcohol disorder zones as evidence of the worthlessness of such actions, but he knows as well as I do that they are a very useful stick with which to prod, if not to beat, local licensing committees and agencies involved in making town and city centres safer. They are to some extent, the ultimate weapon to have at one's disposal, because they bring with them a certain stigma about what a town or city centre might be like. Quite often, partners will go to almost any length-in other words, make the improvements they have been offering to make but never quite got round to-to manage a problem in a town and city centre and fall short of becoming an alcohol disorder zone. I will not, therefore, dismiss alcohol disorder zones, as clearly I would not want anybody to dismiss the measures either.
I refute the suggestion that the Government got all of it wrong; that denies the change in behaviour for the better in many towns and cities throughout the country. It is not the case that every town and city centre is an alcohol-fuelled wild west. That would be unfair to the police and those in local authorities who take the matter seriously. A lot of people need to take it more seriously, but many do a good job. If further measures are necessary, they need to be targeted and proportionate, which includes referring to times when there are specific problems.
We have not just woken up to the issue. As I explained to the hon. Member for Hornchurch on the Floor of the House, he must accept that the development of policy in such an important area as tackling alcohol-related disorder is a never-ending continuum. We want to get it absolutely right, often with the advice of the police and others on how best we can do so. Pre-loading is a worry. However, if we decided to close bars and clubs at the point when people were arriving in a pre-loaded state, we would be moving the measures to much earlier- 10 or 11 o'clock at night. That would not be proportionate or necessary.
The hon. Gentleman asked why we needed an evidence base to support such an order. That is how the licensing system works. It is an evidence-based system. Police and others need to bring forward evidence that there is a problem. Sometimes in my area there is a difference between the views of the trade, as we would expect, and how bad the situation is for residents and how bad it is for the police. Nevertheless, it is important that such matters are based on evidence and not the whim of a party. We do not expect the measure to be used hugely, because a lot of things can be used to deal with single premises or a few premises in an area, but only when the perception of a general problem in a city or town centre is such that those responsible for making the decision at local level believe that it would be helpful. That is why we want the provision in the Bill.
The hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington is absolutely right to put the provision in the context of all the other things we need to discuss and act on to tackle alcohol in our society, including pricing. However, the matter is not about pricing, but what happens in town and city centres between 3 am and 6 am. Evidence suggests that one of the down effects of the changes to licensing was an uplift in the statistics on alcohol-fuelled violence. It is therefore right to introduce the measure.

Tom Brake: I do not dispute the effect to which the Minister refers, but presumably he is not disputing the fact that in some of our towns and cities, the uplift in violence happens at an earlier stage so the hours between 3 am to 6 am miss the peak in violence.

Alan Campbell: That time does not miss the peak in violence because, in reality, there was also an uplift during the hours that we are addressing. I am not disputing the fact that in the early morning there are problems in some towns and cities. Measures can be brought into play at such times but, because of the uplift at a particular time of the early morning and because we want a proportionate response, we believe that between 3 am and 6 am is the right time for the measure. If the hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington is arguing that the police and local authorities will be knocking on our door asking whether the timing is right and will we be considering extending the measure to other times, I cannot read into that. All I am saying is that we believe that there is an evidential base for the measure. It will help locally both those whose job it is to organise the night-time and early morning economy, and residents.

Amendment 175 agreed to.

David Hanson: I beg to move amendment 177, in clause 44, page 85, line 11, at end insert-
'( ) Section [Persons subject to control order: powers of search and seizure] (persons subject to control order: powers of search and seizure) extends to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.'.

This amendment secures that the new clause inserted into the Bill by NC32 on searches of persons subject to control orders will extend to the whole of the United Kingdom.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 32-Persons subject to control order: powers of search and seizure.
Government amendment 178.

David Hanson: New clause 32 and the consequential amendments will introduce a power for police officers to search the person of a controlled individual in specified circumstances, and allow them to seize articles of concern as appropriate. The clause fills a gap, which has been identified by ourselves and-dare I say it?-the courts in relation to how we deal with controlled individuals who are on control orders in the community at the moment. The important power of personal search of a controlled individual is on the face of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. We have recently had two court judgments, the latest of which was in November last year. Members may be aware that Lord Carlile, in his fifth report on control orders published on 1 February earlier this month, indicated that we need to rectify the situation and bring it into an appropriate legal framework.
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 provides that the Secretary of State may impose "any obligations" on an individual, which are considered
"necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that individual in terrorism-related activity".
The Act provides a number of obligations for the individual that the control order "may include", but does not expressly include an obligation for the individual to allow him or herself to be searched. Given that the wording of the Act makes it clear that the list of obligations that may be imposed is indicative rather than definitive, we considered that the general power was available, but sadly-or otherwise-the courts have taken a different view. In July last year, the Court of Appeal held that the 2005 Act was insufficient to authorise the imposition by a control order of an obligation to submit to a personal search.
In November last year, as I have already indicated, the High Court handed down a further ruling, which indicated that we could not enforce a requirement for a controlled person to submit to a personal search prior to being escorted by the police outside their boundary. Those two judgements, whatever our views of them, are causing operational difficulties on the ground. Both the Security Service and the police have assessed that our lack of ability to search a controlled individual under the 2005 Act is a loophole that causes difficulties for us. For example, individuals could have mobile phones, which are not permitted outside the controlled area, and if we cannot search the individual, would proceed with them to alternative places.
Most controlled individuals have geographical boundaries to restrict or disrupt their ability to engage in terrorism-related activities. The judgments make it very difficult for us to manage the risk when those individuals need to make trips outside their geographical boundaries. For those reasons, I have brought forward proposals that would allow for a search of controlled individuals, which I hope will be welcomed by the Committee. It is important, for the small number of people who have a control order, that we have the ability for the police to undertake searches. The numbers are extremely small-currently about 15 individuals. We need this power and I hope the Committee will support it.

James Brokenshire: The amendment and the new clause underline the practical problems with control orders and why we believe they should be reviewed-a view consistent with the security situation-to examine ways in which a suspect could be tried through the normal courts system. As the Minister has said, in essence, the provisions address points that have been brought forward as a consequence of the Court of Appeal decision in the case of GG and the High Court decision in BH. The Court of Appeal judgment found unanimously that section 1(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 could not be read as allowing the inclusion of a personal search obligation and control order, and that its omission from the list of example obligations in section 1(4) meant that there was no statutory basis for the power to include an obligation to submit to a personal search.
The Minister has alluded to the provisions in the separate High Court case concerning BH, which involved the requirement to submit to a personal search so as to enable someone subject to a control order to be escorted outside a controlled zone. I would like to understand whether that is a question of drafting. Was the court case, and the issue that the Minister seeks to address, simply a point of drafting needed to correct a legal lacuna in the Prevention of Terrorism Act, or do more underlying concerns under the European convention on human rights drive the amendment to permit the search in this way? What consideration has been given to it?
As the Minister said, in his report published earlier this month Lord Carlile recommended that this issue be addressed. Obviously, in the short term, we recognise that this is a case for the management of control orders, and therefore we will not object to or vote against the new clause and the amendment that the Government have tabled. However, that does not show any inconsistency in our broad approach regarding how we believe it is essential to bring people to justice before the court wherever possible. It is a question of getting that review done and of examining ways in which that can be achieved. The Minister has made various points about the short-term necessity of this provision, and we understand that. However, it would be helpful to know whether this is a point of drafting, or whether he seeks to address a more fundamental issue.

Tom Brake: I, too, have heard the Minister's explanation. Our starting point is that we do not think that control orders are appropriate, so we would perhaps not be in the position that the Government are in. We would like to see the judicial process used to ensure that there is no requirement for control orders in the first place.

David Hanson: First and foremost, this is a point of drafting, which I hope helps the hon. Member for Hornchurch. The purpose of the legislation is to ensure that when we search individuals on control orders, we do so in recognition of the legal responsibilities that the Court has indicated we need. We can have a wider debate in the future about the necessity of control orders. I believe that they are necessary. They are not taken lightly but they provide protection for the British public against potential terrorist activity. They are small in number, strictly controlled and have external scrutiny through Lord Carlile. I would commend them to the Committee in any debate, but today I restrict my comments to the new clauses, which are a valuable addition to help protect the British public and ensure that individuals on control orders can be searched under legal cover.

Amendment 177 agreed to.

Robert Flello: I beg to move amendment 147, in clause 44, page 85, line 11, at end insert-
'( ) Sections [Prohibition of alcohol consumption in public places] to [Interpretation of sections [Prohibition of alcohol consumption in public places] to [Places which are not a restricted public place]] extend to England and Wales only.'.

Frank Cook: With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 22-Prohibition of alcohol consumption in public places-
'(1) Subsection (2) applies if a constable reasonably believes that a person is, or has been, consuming intoxicating liquor in a restricted public place or intends to consume intoxicating liquor in such a place.
(2) The constable may require the person concerned-
(a) not to consume in that place anything which is, or which the constable reasonably believes to be, intoxicating liquor;
(b) to surrender anything in his possession which is, or which the constable reasonably believes to be, intoxicating liquor or a container for such liquor (other than a sealed container).
(3) A constable may dispose of anything surrendered to him under subsection (2) in such manner as he considers appropriate.
(4) A person who fails without reasonable excuse to comply with a requirement imposed on him under subsection (2) commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 2 on the standard scale.
(5) A constable who imposes a requirement on a person under subsection (2) shall inform the person concerned that failing without reasonable excuse to comply with the requirement is an offence.'.
New clause 23-Restricted public places-
'(1) A place is, subject to section [Places which are not a restricted public place], a restricted public place if it is a public place in the area of a local authority.
(2) A local authority may for the purposes of subsection (1) by order identify all public places in their area if they are satisfied that-
(a) (i) nuisance or annoyance to members of the public or a section of the public, or
(ii) disorder
has been associated with the consumption of intoxicating liquor in their local authority area; or
(b) at least 20 per cent. of the electors in that local authority area have petitioned the local authority requesting the area covered by the local authority be a restricted public place.
(3) The power conferred by subsection (2) includes power-
(a) to identify a place either specifically or by description;
(b) to revoke or amend orders previously made.
(4) The Secretary of State shall by regulations prescribe the procedure to be followed in connection with the making of orders under subsection (2).
(5) Regulations under subsection (4) shall, in particular, include provision requiring local authorities to publicise the making and effect of orders under subsection (2).
(6) Regulations under subsection (4) are to be made by statutory instrument and are subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.'.
New clause 24-Places which are not a restricted public place-
'(1) A place is not a restricted public place or a part of such a place if it is-
(a) private land, a dwelling place or any place to which the public would not normally have access;
(b) licensed premises or a registered club;
(c) a place within the curtilage of any licensed premises or registered club;
(d) a place where the sale of intoxicating liquor is for the time being authorised by an occasional permission or was so authorised within the last twenty minutes;
(e) a place where the sale of intoxicating liquor is not for the time being authorised by an occasional licence but was so authorised within the last twenty minutes;
(f) a place where facilities or activities relating to the sale or consumption of intoxicating liquor are for the time being permitted by virtue of a permission granted under section 115E of the Highways Act 1980 (c. 66) (highway related uses).
(2) In subsection (1)-
"licenced premises", "occasional licence" and "registered club" have the same meaning as in the Licensing Act 1964 (c. 26); and
"occasional permission" has the same meaning as in the Licensing (Occasional Permissions) Act 1983 (c. 24).'.
New clause 25-Effect of sections [Prohibition of alcohol consumption in public places] to [Places which are not a restricted public place] on byelaws-
'(1) Subsections (2) and (3) apply to any byelaw which-
(a) prohibits, by the creation of an offence, the consumption in a particular public place of intoxicating liquor (including any liquor of a similar nature which falls within the byelaw); or
(b) makes any incidental, supplementary or consequential provision (whether relating to the seizure or control of containers or otherwise).
(2) In so far as any byelaw to which this subsection applies would, apart from this subsection, have effect in relation to any designated public place, the byelaw-
(a) shall cease to have effect in relation to that place; or
(b) where it is made after the order under section [Restricted public places] (2), shall not have effect in relation to that place.
(3) In so far as any byelaw made by a local authority and to which this subsection applies still has effect at the end of the period of 5 years beginning with the day on which this subsection comes into force, it shall cease to have effect at the end of that period in relation to any public place.'.
New clause 26-Interpretation of sections [Prohibition of alcohol consumption in public places] to [Places which are not a restricted public place]-
'(1) In sections [Prohibition of alcohol consumption in public places] to [Places which are not a restricted public place], unless the context otherwise requires-
"restricted public place" has the meaning given by section [Restricted public places] (1);
"intoxicating liquor" has the same meaning as in the Licensing Act 1964; and
"public place" means any place to which the public or any section of the public has access, on payment or otherwise, as of right or by virtue of express or implied permission.
(2) In sections [Restricted public places] to [Effect of sections [Prohibition of alcohol consumption in public places] to [Places which are not a restricted public place] on byelaws] "local authority" means-
(a) in relation to England-
(i) a unitary authority;
(ii) a district council so far as they are not a unitary authority,
(b) in relation to Wales, a county council or a county borough council.
(3) In subsection (2) "unitary authority" means-
(a) the council or a county so far as they are the council for an area for which there are no district councils;
(b) the council of any district comprised in an area for which there is no county council;
(c) a London borough council;
(d) the Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a local authority;
(e) the Council of the Isles of Scilly.'.

Robert Flello: Along with, I suspect, most if not all other hon. Members of the House, since being elected not a week goes by without my casework-be it letters, e-mails or callers at my surgery-involving issues associated with antisocial or criminal behaviour. Frequently, such behaviour is alcohol-related and causes a huge range of problems. Such behaviour might occur in the local park down in Fenton, or in the back alleys of Fenpark. It might occur in the shopping centres in and around Longton, up on Sandford Hill or Meir Hay, across at Meir where the shops are, or in some other area such as Meir Park or Trentham. Across the constituency, time and again alcohol-related problems are arising because people are engaging in antisocial behaviour or criminal activity in the street due to drink.
Over the past few years I have held a number of public meetings at which I have brought together the police, the local authority and different agencies to tackle these issues with the community. At some of the meetings, hundreds of people have come together to address the problems arising in their area. Time and again those problems have the common theme of being alcohol-related.
Residents ask me at those meetings why people are allowed to sit or stand drinking outside an off-licence, perhaps down on the Meir, almost from when it opens. They open the cans, drink and act in an intimidating way, blocking the pavements where parents with pushchairs or prams are trying to get past. They do not always engage in direct antisocial behaviour or criminal activity, but they are often threatening or intimidating. Residents ask me why it seems okay for people to sit on the bandstand in our shopping area with bottles of cider all day, every day, drinking and causing a nuisance, being intimidating through their antisocial behaviour. They also ask me why it is okay at 9.30 in the morning for a couple of guys to be walking through a residential area with cans in their hands. As a can is finished, it is discarded and the next one opened. Time and again residents ask why this is permitted.
Where it can be shown that there is a direct link between alcohol consumption and crime or antisocial behaviour, alcohol restriction zones can be considered, but they, of course, relate to a specific place. There are tough tests to get the ARZs, and there is a perception issue. A particular community-Newstead, for example-might not want an ARZ because it does not want people to have that perception of its area. ARZs are time limited and often, a problem is solved in one area because it has moved somewhere else. When that somewhere else gets fed up with the problem and an ARZ is considered for that area, the drinkers are moved on. Where do they move to? They move back to the first area that was the problem and had the ARZ to start with. There are cost implications in constantly having to go through the process of applying for an ARZ, putting up signage and doing all the associated things.
Following those questions about why such things are permitted, I asked agencies, individuals and residents' associations across my constituency for their views on imposing a blanket ban across a local authority area by simply saying, "You are not allowed to drink in a public place unless it is a designated picnic area or a licensed premises within the curtilage." The unanimous view of individual residents, residents' groups and police officers was that it was a darned good idea. People should not be routinely able to sit in a busy shopping area or walk down residential streets from dawn to dusk drinking, discarding cans and causing a nuisance through intimidating behaviour, which often leads to other issues.
In my part of Stoke-on-Trent there are lots of back alleyways. People say they get fed up with the local idiots who have filled themselves with beer standing on the street corner on a Friday night, going past a fence or house and giving it a good kicking, throwing over bottles and worse. There are all the problems that come with that, and criminal and antisocial behaviour arises.
With the new clauses I am trying to do two things: prohibit the drinking of alcohol in public places and-through new clause 23-allow residents to override the normal requirements of an ARZ. It would not just be about disorder or nuisance and annoyance to members of the public; people in a local authority area could say, "No, we do not want this in our area." For example, in the city of Stoke-on-Trent, we do not want people to be able to walk down the street drinking alcohol, causing a nuisance, and generating the criminal and antisocial activity that goes with it, irrespective of the wishes of everyone else.
The clauses propose an authority-wide ban on drinking in public as a way of restoring confidence and giving people ownership over their area, so they do not have to be intimidated by groups of drinkers or constantly have to clear up the bottles, cans and associated damage that goes with people thinking it is acceptable to stand on the street corner and drink for however many hours they want. If people want to drink, great; there are plenty of pubs that we want to promote to ensure that people go back to them. It is fine if people want to drink, but they should do it at home or on licensed premises. Communities-our high streets, shopping areas and parks-are not places to drink. The clauses send out that message and would allow ordinary, hard-working, decent people to get their cities back.

Alan Campbell: First, I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, South not only for raising an important matter but for doing so in that thoughtful way, demonstrating his knowledge of the subject and his constituency. I do not feel that I need to visit it, as I know it so well after his description. [Interruption.] We can bring politics and majorities into it but, when my hon. Friend's constituents read Hansard-as I am sure they will-his majority will go up.
We broadly support my hon. Friend's proposals, but many of the powers he proposes are already available to local authorities and the police through designated public place orders in the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. There are 766 DPPOs in existence, and that high take-up demonstrates the popularity of the policy in its current form and the lack of too high an evidential barrier.
I want to point out one or two problems we have with my hon. Friend's proposals and to compare them with the current legislation on drinking in public place orders; for example, the proposed exemption for private property, or any place to which the public do not normally have access, from being part of a restricted area. I am not sure what the scope of that exemption would be, but it could prevent the police from confiscating alcohol in a supermarket car park late at night, thereby reducing their ability to tackle some cases of alcohol-related antisocial behaviour.
My hon. Friend raised an interesting and innovative idea about petitions. If 20 per cent. of local electors petition for the entire borough to be made a restricted public place, the local authority can create a restricted public place without first gathering evidence of the need for one. The petitions duty in the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009, will require local authorities to respond to petitions on all matters of local concern, including alcohol-related crime and disorder. The proposed statutory guidance, which will underpin that duty, will say that local authorities are expected to consider the creation of a DPPO if they are petitioned on alcohol-related crime and disorder.
The petitions duty is more accessible and less prescriptive than the provisions suggested in new clause 23. For example, it would require 20 per cent. of local electors to sign a petition to trigger a response. We estimate that in Birmingham the figure would be in the region of 150,000 signatures. The new clause would remove the current requirement to gather evidence before creating a borough-wide DPPO if the local authority received a petition from 20 per cent. of local electors, yet-we keep coming back to this issue-an evidential base is important and a crucial step in ensuring that action is both appropriate and proportionate.
As the amendment would replicate existing powers, and the proposed policy would, we believe, face difficulties that the existing policy avoids, I am sorry to say that I cannot accept the amendment and the new clauses and I invite my hon. Friend to withdraw them. None the less, I pay tribute to his valuable work in drawing the matter to the attention of the Committee.

Robert Flello: I would like to return to a couple of points. First, on the electorate having their say, although an evidential basis is crucial, it is down to the electorate to make their views known and be listened to on some things-for example, public drinking. With respect to supermarket car parks, I suspect that it is probably not beyond the wit of most people to address the issue. However, I take on board the Minister's comments. I ask him to reconsider in the weeks ahead whether there is scope for widening the DPPO route and making it more accessible.
Mr. Campbellindicated assent.

Robert Flello: The Minister is nodding, indicating that he will consider the issues further. On that basis, I am content, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 44, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 45

Commencement

Amendment made: 112, in clause 45, page 85, line 19, at end insert-
'( ) sections [Introductory] to [Parliamentary control] (compensation of victims of overseas terrorism);'. -(Mr. Hanson.)

This amendment secures that the new provision relating to compensation of victims of overseas terrorism come into force on Royal Assent.

Clause 45, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Frank Cook: With the leave of the Committee, I would like to take Government new clauses 10 to 21 and 31 and 32 together.

James Brokenshire: If possible, I would like to divide the Committee on new clauses 19, 20 and 21. Other than that, I have no other objection to grouping the new clauses in that way.

Frank Cook: We will therefore take new clauses 10 to 18.

New Clause 10

Charges for vehicle release: appeals
'(1) The Private Security Industry Act 2001 is amended as follows.
(2) Before section 23 there is inserted-
"22A Charges for vehicle release: appeals
(1) The Secretary of State shall by regulations make provision for the purpose specified in subsection (2) in a case where, in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, a person carries out-
(a) an activity to which paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 applies by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(c) of that paragraph (demanding or collecting a charge as a condition of the removal of an immobilisation device), or
(b) an activity to which paragraph 3A of Schedule 2 applies by virtue of sub-paragraph (1)(d) of that paragraph (demanding or collecting a charge as a condition of the release of a vehicle).
(2) The purpose referred to in subsection (1) is to entitle a person otherwise entitled to remove the vehicle to appeal against the charge.
(3) Regulations under this section shall specify the grounds on which an appeal may be made.
(4) The grounds may include in particular-
(a) contravention of a code of practice issued by the Authority;
(b) contravention of any requirement imposed by or under this Act (including a condition contained in a licence granted under this Act).
(5) Regulations under this section shall make provision for and in connection with the person to whom an appeal may be made.
(6) That person may in particular be-
(a) a person exercising functions of adjudication or the hearing of appeals under another enactment;
(b) a body established by the Secretary of State under the regulations;
(c) an individual appointed under the regulations by the Secretary of State or by another person specified in the regulations.
(7) Regulations under this section may also include provision-
(a) as to the procedural conditions to be satisfied by a person before an appeal may be made;
(b) as to the payment of a fee by the appellant;
(c) as to the procedure (including time limits) for making an appeal;
(d) as to the procedure for deciding an appeal;
(e) as to the payment to the appellant by the respondent of-
(i) the charge against which the appeal is made;
(ii) other costs incurred by the appellant in consequence of the activity referred to in subsection (1);
(f) as to the payment by a party to an appeal of-
(i) costs of the other party in relation to the adjudication;
(ii) other costs in respect of the adjudication;
(g) as to the payment by the respondent to an appeal, in a case where the appeal is granted, of a charge in respect of the costs of adjudications under the regulations;
(h) as to the effect and enforcement of a decision of the person to whom an appeal is made;
(i) requiring or authorising the person to whom an appeal is made to provide information relating to the appeal to the Authority;
(j) to the effect that a person who makes a representation that is false in a material particular, and does so recklessly or knowing it to be false, commits an offence triable summarily and punishable with a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.
(8) The provision specified in paragraphs (e), (f) and (g) of subsection (7) includes provision authorising the person to whom an appeal is made to require payment of the matters specified in those paragraphs."
(3) In section 24 (orders and regulations), in subsection (4), after "section 3(2)(j)" there is inserted "or 22A".'-(Mr. Hanson.)

This amendment requires the Secretary of State to make regulations allowing appeals to be made against charges for the removal of an immobilisation device or other release of a vehicle. The regulations will under section 24(3) of the Private Security Industry Act 2001 be subject to negative resolution.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 11

Introductory
'(1) The Secretary of State may make arrangements for making payments to, or in respect of, persons who are injured as a result of an act designated under subsection (2).
(2) The Secretary of State may designate an act under this subsection if-
(a) it took place outside the United Kingdom,
(b) it took place on or after 18 January 2010,
(c) in the view of the Secretary of State the act constitutes terrorism within the meaning of the Terrorism Act 2000 (see section 1 of that Act), and
(d) having regard to all the circumstances, the Secretary of State considers that it would be appropriate to designate it.
(3) Nothing in this section affects any power of the Secretary of State to make payments to, or in respect of, persons who are injured as a result of terrorism outside the United Kingdom.
(4) In sections [Introductory] to [Parliamentary control], "injury" includes fatal injury (and "injured" is to be construed accordingly).'. -(Mr. Hanson.)

This new clause enables the Secretary of State to make arrangements for making payments to persons injured overseas as a result of designated terrorist acts. This power will not affect any other power of the Secretary of State to make similar payments (see subsection (3)).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 12

Compensation scheme
'(1) Arrangements under section [Introductory] may include the making of a scheme providing, in particular, for-
(a) the circumstances in which payments may be made, and
(b) the categories of person to whom payments may be made.
(2) The scheme is to be known as the Victims of Overseas Terrorism Compensation Scheme ("the Scheme").
(3) Sums required for payments to be made in accordance with the Scheme are to be provided by the Secretary of State.
(4) Schedule [Compensation of victims of overseas terrorism: consequential amendments] (which makes consequential amendments relating to the Scheme) is part of this section.'.-(Mr. Hanson.)

This new clause makes provision for the Victims of Overseas Terrorism Compensation Scheme which will provide for the circumstances in which payments may be made and the categories of person to whom payments may be made.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 13

Eligibility and applications
'(1) The Scheme may make provision about a person's eligibility for a payment under it by reference to any or all of the following factors-
(a) the nationality of the person (or the injured person);
(b) the place of residence of the person (or the injured person);
(c) the length of time the person (or the injured person) has resided there;
(d) any other factors that the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(2) The Scheme may provide that applications for payments under it may only be made-
(a) by eligible persons;
(b) within a period specified in the Scheme (and the Scheme may specify different periods for different descriptions of act);
(c) in a manner or form specified in the Scheme.'. -(Mr. Hanson.)

This new clause enables the making of provision in the scheme for applications for payments only to be made by eligible persons and the factors by which eligibility may be determined.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14

Payments
'(1) The Scheme may make provision determining the amount of payments to be made under it to, or in respect of, persons injured as a result of an act designated under section [Introductory](2) by reference to any or all of the following factors-
(a) the nature of the injury;
(b) loss of earnings resulting from the injury;
(c) expenses that have been or will be incurred as a result of the injury;
(d) any other factors that the Secretary of State considers appropriate.
(2) The Scheme may make provision-
(a) as to the circumstances in which a payment may be withheld or the amount of a payment reduced;
(b) for payments to be repayable in circumstances specified in the Scheme;
(c) for payments to be made subject to conditions;
(d) for payments not to exceed such maximum amounts as may be specified in the Scheme.
(3) Any amount which falls to be repaid by virtue of subsection (2)(b) is recoverable as a debt due to the Crown.
(4) Any sums received by the Secretary of State under any provision of the Scheme made by virtue of subsection (2)(b) are to be paid by the Secretary of State into the Consolidated Fund.
(5) Any assignment (or, in Scotland, assignation) of, or charge on, a payment made under the Scheme, and any agreement to assign or charge such a payment, is void.
(6) On the bankruptcy of an individual to whom a payment is made under the Scheme (or in Scotland, on the sequestration of such an individual's estate), the payment shall not pass to any trustee or other person acting on behalf of the individual's creditors.'.-(Mr. Hanson.)

This new clause enables the making of provision in the scheme for determining the amount of payments by reference to factors including the nature of the injury and other matters in connection with the making of payments.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 15

Claims officers etc
'(1) The Scheme may include provision for applications to be determined and payments to be made by persons ("claims officers") appointed for the purpose by the Secretary of State.
(2) A claims officer-
(a) is to be appointed on such terms and conditions as the Secretary of State considers appropriate;
(b) is not to be regarded as having been appointed to exercise functions of the Secretary of State or to act on behalf of the Secretary of State.
(3) No decision taken by a claims officer shall be regarded as having been taken by, or on behalf of, the Secretary of State.
(4) The Secretary of State may pay such remuneration, allowances or gratuities to or in respect of claims officers and other persons exercising functions in relation to the Scheme as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.'. -(Mr. Hanson.)

This new clause provides that the scheme may include provision for applications to be decided by claims officers appointed for the purpose by the Secretary of State. It also provides that such decisions are not to be regarded as taken by the Secretary of State.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 16

Reviews and appeals
'(1) The Scheme must include provision for the review, in such circumstances as it may specify, of any decision taken in respect of an application made under it.
(2) The Scheme must secure that such a review is conducted by a person other than the person who made the decision under review.
(3) The Scheme must include provision for rights of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal against decisions taken on reviews under provisions of the Scheme made by virtue of subsection (1).
(4) The power conferred by section [Payments](2)(a) to provide for the reduction of an amount of a payment includes power to provide for a reduction where, in the opinion of the First-tier Tribunal determining an appeal, the appeal is frivolous or vexatious.'. -(Mr. Hanson.)

By this new clause the scheme must include provision for reviews, in such circumstances as set out, of decisions taken by a claims officer and must include provision for rights of appeal from any review to the First-tier Tribunal.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 17

Reports, accounts and financial records
'(1) The Scheme must include provision for such person as the Secretary of State considers appropriate to make a report to the Secretary of State as soon as possible after the end of each financial year on the operation of the Scheme during that year.
(2) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of every such report before Parliament.
(3) The Scheme must also include provision-
(a) for such person as the Secretary of State considers appropriate-
(i) to keep proper accounts and proper records in relation to the accounts;
(ii) to prepare a statement of accounts in each financial year in such form as the Secretary of State may direct;
(b) requiring such a statement of accounts to be submitted to the Secretary of State at such time as the Secretary of State may direct.
(4) Where a statement of accounts is submitted to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State must send a copy of it to the Comptroller and Auditor General as soon as is reasonably practicable.
(5) The Comptroller and Auditor General must-
(a) examine, certify and report on any statement of accounts received under subsection (4);
(b) lay copies of the statement and of the report made under paragraph (a) before Parliament.
(6) In this section "financial year" means the period beginning with the day on which this section comes into force and ending with the following 31st March and each successive period of 12 months.'.-(Mr. Hanson.)

This new clause ensures that the scheme will contain provision for an annual report to be laid before Parliament and for the preparation of statements of accounts which are to be examined by the Comptroller and Auditor General and laid before Parliament.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 18

Parliamentary control
'(1) Before making the Scheme, the Secretary of State must lay a draft of it before Parliament.
(2) The Secretary of State must not make the Scheme unless the draft has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(3) Before making any alteration to a provision of the Scheme made by virtue of-
(a) section [Eligibility and applications](1) (eligibility for payments under the scheme),
(b) section [Payments](1) (determination of amount of payment),
(c) section [Payments](2)(a) (circumstances in which payment may be withheld or reduced),
(d) section [Payments](2)(d) (payments not to exceed specified maximum amount), or
(e) section [Reviews and appeals] (reviews and appeals),
the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a draft of the provision as proposed to be altered.
(4) The Secretary of State must not give effect to the proposal concerned unless the draft has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.
(5) Before making any other alteration to the Scheme the Secretary of State must lay a statement of the altered provision before Parliament.
(6) If a statement laid before either House of Parliament under subsection (5) is disapproved by a resolution of that House passed before the end of the period of 40 days beginning with the date on which the statement was laid, the Secretary of State must-
(a) make such alterations in the Scheme as appear to the Secretary of State to be required in the circumstances, and
(b) before the end of the period of 40 days beginning with the date on which the resolution was made, lay a statement of those alterations before Parliament.
(7) In calculating the period of 40 days mentioned in subsection (6), any period during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than 4 days is to be disregarded.'.-(Mr. Hanson.)

This new clause secures that the making of the scheme and any alterations to it will be subject to parliamentary procedures. The scheme must be laid before Parliament in draft and approved by resolution of both Houses before it can be made.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Simon Burns: On a point of order, Mr. Cook. May I seek your guidance? Procedurally, is it possible to have a single Division on new clauses 19, 20 and 21 together?

Frank Cook: No, because it is conceivable that one new clause might be successful-all three might be successful-but it would not count if they were connected in that way.

New Clause 19

Material subject to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995
'(1) This section applies to the following material-
(a) relevant physical data or samples taken under section 18(2), (6) or (6A) of the 1995 Act (prints, samples etc. in criminal investigations), and
(b) a DNA profile derived from a DNA sample falling within paragraph (a).
(2) Material retained under this section must not be used other than-
(a) in the interests of national security, or
(b) for the purposes of a terrorist investigation.
(3) Material to which this section applies may be retained-
(a) if the chief constable determines that it is necessary for the material to be retained for the purposes of national security, and
(b) for as long as the determination has effect.
(4) A determination mentioned in subsection (3)-
(a) has effect for a maximum of 2 years beginning with the date on which the material would (but for this section) first become liable for destruction under the 1995 Act,
(b) may be renewed.
(5) The reference in subsection (3) to the chief constable is a reference to the chief constable of the police force-
(a) of which the constable who took (or directed the taking of) the material was a member, or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, of which the constable who took (or directed the taking of) the sample from which the profile was derived was a member.
(6) Subsection (3) has effect despite any provision to the contrary in the 1995 Act.
(7) The reference in subsection (2) to using material includes a reference to allowing any check to be made against it and to disclosing it to any person.
(8) In this section-
"the 1995 Act" is the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
"DNA profile" means any information derived from a DNA sample,
"DNA sample" means any material that has come from a human body and consists of or includes human cells,
"terrorist investigation" has the meaning given by section 32 of the Terrorism Act 2000.'. -(Mr. Hanson.)

This New Clause makes provision for the retention of relevant physical data and samples beyond the time limits which otherwise apply under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 where a chief constable determines that this is necessary for the purposes of national security.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to.

New clause 19 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 20

Material subject to the Terrorism Act 2000 (Scotland)
'(1) Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 is amended as follows.
(2) In paragraph 20-
(a) for sub-paragraph (3) there is substituted-
"(3) Material to which this sub-paragraph applies may be retained after it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was taken or derived.
(3A) Sub-paragraph (3) applies to the following material-
(a) relevant physical data or samples taken by virtue of this paragraph, and
(b) a DNA profile derived from a DNA sample so taken.
(3B) Sub-paragraph (3)-
(a) in the case to which sub-paragraph (1) relates, has effect despite any provision to the contrary in the Act referred to in that sub-paragraph,
(b) in any case, is subject to paragraphs 20A to 20E.
(3C) In this paragraph and paragraphs 20A to 20I-
"DNA profile" means any information derived from a DNA sample,
"DNA sample" means any material that has come from a human body and consists of or includes human cells.",
(b) sub-paragraph (4) is repealed.
(3) After paragraph 20 there is inserted-
"20A (1) A DNA sample to which paragraph 20(3) applies must be destroyed-
(a) as soon as a DNA profile has been derived from the sample, or
(b) if sooner, before the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the date on which the sample was taken.
(2) Any other sample to which paragraph 20(3) applies must be destroyed before the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the date on which it was taken.
20B (1) This paragraph applies to material falling within sub-paragraph (2) relating to a person who-
(a) has no previous convictions or only one exempt conviction,
(b) is detained under Schedule 7 or section 41, and
(c) is aged 18 or over on the date he is detained.
(2) Material falls within this sub-paragraph if it is-
(a) relevant physical data to which paragraph 20(3) applies, or
(b) a DNA profile to which that paragraph applies.
(3) The material must be destroyed-
(a) in the case of relevant physical data, before the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date on which it was taken,
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, before the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date on which the DNA sample from which the profile was derived was taken (or, if the profile was derived from more than one DNA sample, the date on which the first of those samples was taken).
(4) But if, before the material is required to be destroyed by virtue of this paragraph, the person is detained under Schedule 7 or section 41, the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date the person is detained.
(5) This paragraph ceases to have effect in relation to the material if, before the material is required to be destroyed by virtue of this paragraph, the person is convicted of-
(a) an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(b) a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.
20C (1) This paragraph applies to material falling within sub-paragraph (2) relating to a person who-
(a) has no previous convictions or only one exempt conviction,
(b) is detained under Schedule 7, and
(c) and is aged under 18 on the date he is detained.
(2) Material falls within this sub-paragraph if it is-
(a) relevant physical data to which paragraph 20(3) applies, or
(b) a DNA profile to which that paragraph applies.
(3) The material must be destroyed-
(a) in the case of relevant physical data, before the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the date on which the material was taken,
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, before the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the date on which the DNA sample from which the profile was derived was taken (or, if the profile was derived from more than one DNA sample, the date on which the first of those samples was taken).
(4) But if, before the material is required to be destroyed by virtue of this paragraph, the person is detained under Schedule 7 or section 41-
(a) where the person is aged 18 or over on the date he is detained, the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date he is detained,
(b) where-
(i) the person is detained under Schedule 7, and
(ii) the person is aged under 18 on the date he is detained,
the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the date he is detained,
(c) where-
(i) the person is detained under section 41, and
(ii) the person is aged under 16 on the date he is detained,
the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the date the person is detained,
(d) where-
(i) the person is detained under section 41, and
(ii) the person is aged 16 or 17 on the date he is detained,
the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date the person is detained.
(5) This paragraph ceases to have effect in relation to the material if, before the material is required to be destroyed by virtue of this paragraph, the person is convicted of-
(a) an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(b) a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.
20D (1) This paragraph applies to material falling within sub-paragraph (2) relating to a person who-
(a) has no previous convictions or only one exempt conviction,
(b) is detained under section 41, and
(c) is aged under 16 on the date he is detained.
(2) Material falls within this sub-paragraph if it is-
(a) relevant physical data to which paragraph 20(3) applies, or
(b) a DNA profile to which that paragraph applies.
(3) The material must be destroyed-
(a) in the case of relevant physical data, before the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the date on which the material was taken,
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, before the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the date on which the DNA sample from which the profile was derived was taken (or, if the profile was derived from more than one DNA sample, the date on which the first of those samples was taken).
(4) But if, before the material is required to be destroyed by virtue of this paragraph, the person is detained under Schedule 7 or section 41-
(a) where the person is aged 18 or over on the date he is detained, the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date the person is detained,
(b) where-
(i) the person is detained under Schedule 7, and
(ii) the person is aged under 18 on the date he is detained,
the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the date the person is detained,
(c) where-
(i) the person is detained under section 41, and
(ii) the person is aged under 16 on the date he is detained,
the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the date the person is detained,
(d) where-
(i) the person is detained under section 41, and
(ii) the person is aged 16 or 17 on the date he is detained,
the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date the person is detained.
(5) This paragraph ceases to have effect in relation to the material if, before the material is required to be destroyed by virtue of this paragraph, the person is convicted of-
(a) an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(b) a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.
20E (1) This paragraph applies to material falling within sub-paragraph (2) relating to a person who-
(a) has no previous convictions or only one exempt conviction,
(b) is detained under section 41, and
(c) is aged 16 or 17 on the date he is detained.
(2) Material falls within this sub-paragraph if it is-
(a) relevant physical data to which paragraph 20(3) applies, or
(b) a DNA profile to which that paragraph applies.
(3) The material must be destroyed-
(a) in the case of relevant physical data, before the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date on which the material was taken,
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, before the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date on which the DNA sample from which the profile was derived was taken (or, if the profile was derived from more than one DNA sample, the date on which the first of those samples was taken).
(4) But if, before the material is required to be destroyed by virtue of this paragraph, the person is detained under Schedule 7 or section 41-
(a) where the person is aged 18 or over on the date he is detained, the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date the person is detained,
(b) where-
(i) the person is detained under Schedule 7, and
(ii) the person is aged under 18 on the date he is detained,
the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the date the person is detained,
(c) where-
(i) the person is detained under section 41, and
(ii) the person is aged 16 or 17 on the date he is detained,
the material may be further retained until the end of the period of 6 years beginning with the date the person is detained.
(5) This paragraph ceases to have effect in relation to the material if, before the material is required to be destroyed by virtue of this paragraph, the person is convicted of-
(a) an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(b) a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland.
20F (1) For the purposes of paragraphs 20B to 20E-
(a) a person has no previous convictions if the person has not previously been convicted-
(i) in Scotland of an offence which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(ii) in England and Wales or Northern Ireland of a recordable offence; and
(b) if a person has been previously so convicted of a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland, the conviction is exempt if it is in respect of a recordable offence other than a qualifying offence, committed when the person is aged under 18.
(2) For the purposes of paragraphs 20B to 20E, "qualifying offence" and "recordable offence" have the meanings given by paragraphs 14F(2) and 15(4) respectively.
(3) For the purposes of paragraphs 20B to 20E, a person is to be treated as having been convicted of an offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland if he has been given a caution, or has been warned or reprimanded, as mentioned in paragraph 14F(3).
(4) If a person is convicted of more than one offence arising out of a single course of action, those convictions are to be treated as a single conviction for the purpose of any provision of those paragraphs relating to an exempt, first or subsequent conviction.
(5) Subject to the completion of any search by virtue of paragraph 20I(2) that the chief constable considers necessary or desirable, material to which any of paragraphs 20B to 20E applies must be destroyed immediately if it appears to the chief constable that-
(a) the arrest under section 41 was unlawful,
(b) the taking of the material concerned was unlawful,
(c) the arrest under section 41 was based on mistaken identity, or
(d) other circumstances relating to the arrest under section 41 or the detention under Schedule 7 mean that it is appropriate to destroy the material.
(6) The reference in sub-paragraph (5) to the chief constable is a reference to the chief constable of the police force-
(a) of which the constable who took (or directed the taking of) the material was a member, or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, of which the constable who took (or directed the taking of) the sample from which the profile was derived was a member.
20G (1) If the chief constable determines that it is necessary for relevant physical data or a DNA profile to which paragraph 20(3) applies to be retained for the purposes of national security-
(a) the material is not required to be destroyed in accordance with paragraphs 20B to 20E, and
(b) paragraph 20I(3) does not apply to the material,
for as long as the determination has effect.
(2) A determination under sub-paragraph (1) has effect for a maximum of two years beginning with the date on which the material would otherwise be required to be destroyed, but a determination may be renewed.
(3) The reference in sub-paragraph (1) to the chief constable is a reference to the chief constable of the police force-
(a) of which the constable who took (or directed the taking of) the material was a member, or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, of which the constable who took (or directed the taking of) the sample from which the profile was derived was a member.
20H (1) If material is required to be destroyed by virtue of any of paragraphs 20B to 20E, any copies of the material must also be destroyed.
(2) If a DNA profile is required to be destroyed by virtue of any of those paragraphs, no copy may be kept except in a form which does not include information which identifies the person to whom the DNA profile relates.
(3) Sub-paragraph (4) applies if a person makes a request to the chief constable to be notified when any of the following material is destroyed under any of paragraphs 20A to 20E-
(a) material taken in Scotland, or
(b) a DNA profile derived from such material.
(4) The chief constable or a person authorised by the chief constable (or on the chief constable's behalf) must within three months of the request issue the person with a certificate recording the destruction.
(5) The references in sub-paragraphs (3) and (4) to the chief constable are references to the chief constable of the police force-
(a) of which the constable who took (or directed the taking of) the material was a member, or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, of which the constable who took (or directed the taking of) the sample from which the profile was derived was a member.
20I (1) Any material to which paragraph 20(3) applies which is retained after it has fulfilled the purpose for which it was taken or derived must not be used other than-
(a) in the interests of national security,
(b) for the purposes of a terrorist investigation,
(c) for purposes related to the prevention or detection of crime, the investigation of an offence or the conduct of a prosecution, or
(d) for purposes related to the identification of a deceased person or of the person to whom the material relates.
(2) Subject to sub-paragraph (1), the material may be checked against-
(a) other material to which paragraph 20(3) applies,
(b) material to which paragraph 14 applies,
(c) material to which section 18 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 applies,
(d) any of the relevant physical data, samples and information to which section 20 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 applies, and
(e) any of the fingerprints, samples and information mentioned in-
(i) section 63A(1)(a) and (b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, or
(ii) Article 63A(1)(a) and (b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1989.
(3) Material which is required to be destroyed by virtue of any of paragraphs 20A to 20E and 20H must not at any time after it is required to be destroyed be used-
(a) in evidence against the person to whom the material relates, or
(b) for the purposes of the investigation of any offence.
(4) In this paragraph-
(a) the reference to using material includes a reference to allowing any check to be made against it and to disclosing it to any person,
(b) the reference to crime includes a reference to any conduct which-
(i) constitutes one or more criminal offences (whether under the law of a part of the United Kingdom or of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom), or
(ii) is, or corresponds to, any conduct which, if it all took place in any one part of the United Kingdom, would constitute one or more criminal offences, and
(c) the reference to an investigation and to a prosecution include references respectively to any investigation outside the United Kingdom of any crime or suspected crime and to a prosecution brought in respect of any crime in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom."
(4) Paragraph 21 (as inserted by section 17(3) of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008) is repealed.'.-(Mr. Hanson.)

This New Clause provides for a new regime for the retention, destruction and use of biometric material taken in Scotland under paragraph 20 of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to.

New clause 20 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 21

Material subject to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (Scotland)
'(1) The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 11-
(a) in subsection (6), for the words from "may be retained" to the end there is substituted "must be destroyed before the end of the period of 2 years beginning with the date on which the person ceases to be subject to a control order";
(b) after subsection (6) there is inserted-
"(6A) Subsection (6) applies only if the person to whom the data, sample or information relates has no previous convictions or only one exempt conviction.
(6B) For the purpose of subsection (6A), a person has no previous convictions or only one exempt conviction if the person would have no previous convictions or only one exempt conviction for the purposes of paragraphs 20B to 20E of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (see paragraph 20F of that Schedule).
(6C) Where something is required to be destroyed under subsection (6)-
(a) in any case (except a DNA profile), any copies of the thing must also be destroyed,
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, no copy may be kept except in a form that does not include information which identifies the person to whom the profile relates.
(6D) If a person makes a request to the chief constable to be notified when anything relating to the person is destroyed under subsection (6), the chief constable or a person authorised by the chief constable (or on the chief constable's behalf) must within 3 months of the request issue the person with a certificate recording the destruction.
(6E) The references in subsection (6D) to the chief constable are to be construed in accordance with section 11A(6).";
(c) in subsection (7), after paragraph (a) there is inserted-
"(aa) any material to which paragraph 14 or 20(3) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 applies,";
(d) in subsection (8)-
(i) after the opening words there is inserted-
""DNA profile" has the meaning given by section 11A(9)";
(ii) the definition of "terrorist investigation" is repealed.
(3) After section 11 there is inserted-
"11A Retention and use of material: Scotland
(1) This section applies to the following material if it is required to be destroyed under section 11(6)-
(a) relevant physical data or samples, and
(b) a DNA profile derived from a DNA sample falling within paragraph (a).
(2) Material to which this section applies may be retained-
(a) if (at any time) the person to whom it relates consents in writing to its retention, and
(b) for as long as the consent is not withdrawn.
(3) Material to which this section applies may be retained without limit of time if, before the material would (but for this section) be required to be destroyed under section 11(6), the person to whom it relates is convicted of-
(a) an offence in Scotland which is punishable by imprisonment, or
(b) a recordable offence in England and Wales or Northern Ireland (as falling to be construed for the purposes of paragraphs 20B to 20E of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 (see paragraph 20F(2) of that Schedule)).
(4) Material to which this section applies may be retained-
(a) if the chief constable determines that it is necessary for the material to be retained for the purposes of national security, and
(b) for as long as the determination has effect.
(5) A determination mentioned in subsection (4)-
(a) has effect for a maximum of 2 years beginning with the date on which the material would (but for this section) be required to be destroyed under section 11(6),
(b) may be renewed.
(6) The reference in subsection (4) to the chief constable is a reference to the chief constable of the police force-
(a) of which the constable who took (or directed the taking of) the material was a member, or
(b) in the case of a DNA profile, of which the constable who took (or directed the taking of) the sample from which the profile derived was a member.
(7) Material retained under section 11 or this section must not be used other than-
(a) in the interests of national security, or
(b) for the purposes of a terrorist investigation.
(8) Section 11(6) is subject to this section.
(9) In this section-
"DNA profile" means any information derived from a DNA sample,
"DNA sample" means any material that has come from a human body and consists of or includes human cells,
"terrorist investigation" has the meaning given by section 32 of the Terrorism Act 2000."'. -(Mr. Hanson.)

This New Clause provides for the retention, destruction and use of material that has been obtained from an individual who is subject to a control order in Scotland. To this end, it amends section 11 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and inserts a new section 11A.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to.

New clause 21 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 31

Power to restrict sale and supply of alcohol
'(1) The Licensing Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) In Part 9 (miscellaneous and supplementary), after section 172 there is inserted-
172A Power to make early morning alcohol restriction order
(1) If a licensing authority considers it necessary for the promotion of the licensing objectives, it may, subject as follows, make an order under this section.
(2) An order under this section is an order providing that -
(a) premises licences and club premises certificates granted by the authority, and temporary event notices given to the authority, shall not have effect to the extent that they authorise the sale of alcohol between 3am and 6am, and
(b) club premises certificates granted by the authority shall not have effect to the extent that they authorise the supply of alcohol by or on behalf a club to, or to the order of, a member of the club between 3am and 6am.
(3) It is immaterial for the purposes of an order under this section whether a premises licence or club premises certificate is granted, or a temporary event notice is given, before or after the order is made.
(4) An order under this section may provide that it is to apply-
(a) every day or only on particular days (for example, particular days of the week or year),
(b) in relation to the whole or part of a licensing authority's area, or
(c) for a limited or unlimited period.
(5) An order under this section must specify-
(a) the days in relation to which it is to apply,
(b) the area in relation to which it is to apply,
(c) if it is to apply for a limited period, that period, and
(d) the date from which it is to apply.
(6) An order under this section must-
(a) be in the prescribed form, and
(b) have the prescribed content.
172B Procedural requirements for early morning alcohol restriction order
(1) A licensing authority proposing to make an order under section 172A must-
(a) advertise the proposed order in the prescribed manner,
(b) hold a hearing to consider any relevant representations, unless the authority and each person who has made such representations agree that a hearing is unnecessary.
(2) In this section "relevant representations" means representations which-
(a) are about the likely effect of the making of the proposed order on the promotion of the licensing objectives,
(b) are made to the licensing authority by-
(i) an affected person,
(ii) an interested party, or
(iii) a responsible authority,
(c) are made in the prescribed form and manner and within the prescribed period,
(d) have not been withdrawn, and
(e) in the case of representations made by an affected person or an interested party (who is not also a responsible authority), that they are not, in the opinion of the licensing authority, frivolous or vexatious.
(3) In subsection (2)(b)(i) "affected person" means-
(a) the holder of a premises licence or club premises certificate in respect of affected premises,
(b) the premises user in relation to a temporary event notice in respect of affected premises,
(c) a person who has applied for a premises licence or club premises certificate in respect of affected premises (where the application has not been determined), and
(d) a person to whom a provisional statement has been issued in respect of affected premises.
(4) In subsection (2)(b)(ii) "interested party" means-
(a) a person living in the vicinity of affected premises,
(b) a body representing persons who live in that vicinity,
(c) a person involved in a business in that vicinity,
(d) a body representing persons involved in such businesses, and
(e) a member of the licensing authority.
(5) In subsection (2)(b)(iii) "responsible authority" means-
(a) the chief officer of police for a police area any part of which is in the area specified in the order,
(b) the fire and rescue authority for an area any part of which is in the area specified in the order,
(c) the local weights and measures authority for any such area,
(d) the enforcing authority within the meaning given by section 18 of the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 for any such area,
(e) the local planning authority within the meaning given by the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 for any such area,
(f) the local authority by which statutory functions are exercisable in the area specified in the order in relation to minimising or preventing the risk of pollution of the environment or of harm to human health,
(g) a body which-
(i) represents those who, in relation to the area specified in the order, are responsible for, or interested in, matters relating to the protection of children from harm, and
(ii) is recognised by the licensing authority for the purposes of this section as being competent to advise on such matters,
(h) any other licensing authority in whose area part of any affected premises is situated,
(i) where affected premises are a vessel-
(i) a navigation authority (within the meaning of section 221(1) of the Water Resources Act 1991) having functions in relation to the waters where the vessel is usually moored or berthed or any waters where it is navigated at a time when it is used for licensable activities to which the proposed order relates,
(ii) the Environment Agency,
(iii) the British Waterways Board, and
(iv) the Secretary of State, and
(j) a prescribed person.
(6) Where a licensing authority determines for the purposes of subsection (2)(e) that any representations are frivolous or vexatious, it must notify the person who made them of its reasons for its determination.
(7) In this section-
"affected premises", in relation to a proposed order, means premises in respect of which it applies from the date specified in it;
"statutory function" means a function conferred by or under an enactment.
172C Making of early morning alcohol restriction order
(1) A licensing authority may not make an order under section 172A applying in relation to-
(a) an area not specified in the proposed order advertised under section 172B, or
(b) a day not specified in that proposed order.
(2) After making an order under section 172A a licensing authority must publish it or otherwise make it available-
(a) in the prescribed form and manner, and
(b) within the prescribed period.
172D Variation and revocation of early morning alcohol restriction order
(1) A licensing authority may vary or revoke an order under section 172A.
(2) Sections 172B and 172C apply in relation to the variation or revocation of an order under section 172A as in relation to the making of such an order.
172E Exceptions from effect of early morning alcohol restriction order
(1) An order under section 172A does not apply in prescribed cases or circumstances.
(2) The cases referred to in subsection (1) may in particular be defined by reference to-
(a) particular kinds of premises, or
(b) particular days.
(3) An order under section 172A is subject to an order under section 172 (whether made before or afterwards), unless and to the extent that the order under section 172 provides otherwise."
(3) In section 7 (exercise and delegation of functions), in subsection (2), after paragraph (a) (but before the final "or") there is inserted-
"(aa) the functions of making, and varying or revoking, an order under section 172A (early morning alcohol restriction order),".'-(Mr. Hanson.)

This New Clause enables licensing authorities to suspend the effect of licences and other authorisations under the Licensing Act 2003, so far as relating to the sale and supply of alcohol, between 3am and 6am.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 32

Persons subject to control order: powers of search and seizure
'(1) In the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, after section 7C there is inserted-
"7D Powers of personal search and seizure
(1) A constable may-
(a) search a controlled person (in his place of residence or elsewhere) for the purpose mentioned in subsection (2);
(b) detain a person for the purpose of such a search.
(2) The purpose is-
(a) in a case where the search is carried out in connection with a journey for which the controlled person is escorted by a constable, that of ascertaining that the controlled person is not in possession of anything that could be used to threaten or harm any person;
(b) in any case, that of ascertaining whether obligations imposed by or under the control order have been, are being, or are about to be contravened.
(3) The power conferred by subsection (1) may be exercised at any time when a constable is in the presence of a controlled person (including following entry onto premises under section 7A, 7B or 7C).
(4) A constable may seize anything that he finds in the course of a search under subsection (1)-
(a) for the purpose of ascertaining whether obligations imposed by or under the control order have been, are being, or are about to be contravened;
(b) for the purpose of securing that the controlled person complies with the control order;
(c) if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the thing may be used to threaten or harm any person; or
(d) if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that-
(i) the thing is or contains evidence in relation to an offence; and
(ii) it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent it being concealed, lost, damaged, altered or destroyed.
(5) A constable may use reasonable force for the purpose of exercising a power conferred on him by this section.
7E Retention of things seized under section 7D
(1) Anything that is seized under section 7D(4) may be-
(a) subjected to tests;
(b) retained for as long as is necessary in all the circumstances (which may be beyond the period for which the control order remains in force).
(2) In particular (and regardless of the ground on which the thing was seized)-
(a) if a constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the thing is or contains evidence in relation to an offence, it may be retained-
(i) for use as evidence at a trial for an offence; or
(ii) for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence; and
(b) if a constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the thing has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence, it may be retained in order to establish its lawful owner.
(3) Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose.
(4) Nothing in this section affects any power of a court to make an order under section 1 of the Police (Property) Act 1897.".
(2) In section 1 of that Act (power to make control orders)-
(a) in subsection (4)(l) (removal following search of premises) after "tests or" there is inserted "(subject to subsections (5A) to (5C))";
(b) after subsection (5) there is inserted-
"(5A) If a constable has reasonable grounds for believing that something removed by virtue of a requirement under subsection (4)(l) (removal following search of premises) is or contains evidence in relation to an offence, it may be seized and retained for as long as is necessary in all the circumstances (which may be beyond the period for which the control order remains in force).
(5B) In particular-
(a) the thing may be retained-
(i) for use as evidence at a trial for an offence; or
(ii) for forensic examination or for investigation in connection with an offence; and
(b) if a constable has reasonable grounds for believing that the thing has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence, it may be retained in order to establish its lawful owner.
(5C) Nothing may be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (5B)(a) if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose.".
(3) In the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, in section 1 (power to remove documents for examination), in subsection (1)(e), for "or 7C" there is substituted ", 7C or 7D".'.-(Mr. Hanson.)

This new clause amends the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 to insert new powers allowing a constable, for specified purposes, to conduct a search of a person subject to a control order and to seize and retain articles found.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Schedule 1

'Compensation of victims of overseas terrorism: consequential amendments

Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 (c. 13)
1 After section 11B of the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967, there is inserted-
"11C The Victims of Overseas Terrorism Compensation Scheme
(1) For the purposes of this Act, administrative functions exercisable by an administrator of the Victims of Overseas Terrorism Compensation Scheme (see section [compensation scheme] of the Crime and Security Act 2010) ("Scheme functions") shall be taken to be administrative functions of a government department to which this Act applies.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a claims officer appointed under section [claims officers etc](1) of the Crime and Security Act 2010 is an administrator of the Scheme.
(3) The principal officer in relation to any complaint made in respect of any action taken in respect of Scheme functions by a claims officer is such person as may from time to time be designated by the Secretary of State for the purposes of this subsection.
(4) The conduct of an investigation under this Act in respect of any action taken in respect of Scheme functions shall not affect-
(a) any action so taken; or
(b) any power or duty of any person to take further action with respect to any matters subject to investigation."

Inheritance Tax Act 1984 (c. 51)
2 (1) The Inheritance Tax Act 1984 is amended as follows.
(2) In section 71A (trusts for bereaved minors)-
(a) in subsection (2), after paragraph (b) there is inserted "or
(c) established under the Victims of Overseas Terrorism Compensation Scheme,";
(b) in subsection (4), for "or (b)" there is substituted ", (b) or (c)".
(3) In section 71D (age 18-to-25 trusts), in subsection (2), after paragraph (b) there is inserted "or
(c) established under the Victims of Overseas Terrorism Compensation Scheme,".

Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 (c. 5)
3 In section 732 of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 (compensation awards), in subsections (1) and (2), at the end there is inserted "or the Victims of Overseas Terrorism Compensation Scheme".

Finance Act 2005 (c. 7)
4 In section 35 of the Finance Act 2005 (trusts for relevant minors), in subsection (2), after paragraph (b) there is inserted "or
(c) established under the Victims of Overseas Terrorism Compensation Scheme,".

Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (c. 15)
5 In section 11 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (right to appeal to Upper Tribunal), in subsection (5) (excluded decisions), after paragraph (a) there is inserted-
"(aa) any decision of the First-tier Tribunal on an appeal made in exercise of a right conferred by the Victims of Overseas Terrorism Compensation Scheme in compliance with section [reviews and appeals](3) of the Crime and Security Act 2010,".'.-(Mr. Hanson.)

This Schedule amends other Acts to secure that the new compensation scheme is treated in the same way as the existing Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme in relation to investigations by the Parliamentary Commissioner (para.1), in taxation matters (paras.2 to 4) and in relation to appeals (para.5).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Title

Amendments made: 113, in title, line 5, after 'weapons;' insert
'for the compensation of victims of overseas terrorism;'.

This amendment is consequential on the new provision for compensation of victims of overseas terrorism.
Amendment 176, in title, line 5, after 'weapons;' insert
'about licensing the sale and supply of alcohol;'.

This amendment is consequential on NC10.
Amendment 178, in title, line 5, after 'weapons;', insert
'about searches in relation to persons subject to control orders;'.-(Mr. Hanson.)

This amendment inserts a reference to the new provisions on searches of persons subject to control orders into the long title of the Bill.

Ordered,
That certain written evidence already reported to the House be appended to the proceedings of the Committee.-(Mr. Hanson.)

Question proposed, That the Chairman do report the Bill, as amended, to the House.

David Hanson: Mr. Cook, on behalf of the Government and the Committee, may I thank you and your co-Chairman, Sir Nicholas, for your patience in chairing the Committee? I also thank Mr. Sandall and his team of Clerks, our Hansard colleagues, our badge messengers and the police for their support.
I thank the Opposition for their constructive approach to the Committee. We have accepted some of their amendments in principle and will return to them. I also thank my hon. Friends for their patience, for their occasional contributions and, most of all, for their votes? I offer everybody my best wishes.
Some hon. Members know that this will be their last Committee before the general election, and I wish them Godspeed for the future in their new and successful careers post-Parliament.

James Brokenshire: May I add my thanks for your chairmanship of the Committee, Mr. Cook? Would you also pass on my thanks to your co-Chairman, Sir Nicholas Winterton?

Frank Cook: I shall indeed.

James Brokenshire: This has been a constructive Committee. Although we will continue the debate on DNA and other contentious provisions, I hope that we have made this a better Bill as a consequence of the way in which the Committee has been conducted.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Romford for his sterling support on the Front Bench, and our excellent Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford. I also thank my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham and my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury for their strong support from the Back Benches.
May I also pass on our thanks to the officials, the Clerks and the Hansard reporters, and to the doorkeepers and the police for keeping us safe? As the Minister has said, this may well be the last Committee for some. I wish everyone Godspeed in whatever direction we may take.

Tom Brake: I realise how popular I would be at this point if I spoke at great length to thank everyone who has participated in the Committee. Instead, I shall simply echo the points made by the Minister of State and by the spokesman for the official Opposition. My thanks to you, Mr. Cook, and to all who have participated.

David Hanson: Finally, Mr. Cook, may I thank the people most important to the Bill, namely the officials who have helped to prepare it and who have worked on it? I missed them out in my rush to complete my remarks before a Division in the House. They have been crucial to our success.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill, as amended, accordingly to be reported.

Committee rose.